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A NEW LEGAL THEORY TO TEST EXECUTIVE PAY:
CONTRACTUAL UNCONSCIONABILITY
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Abstract
Lucrative pay to corporate managers remains controversial yet continues to evade
judicial scrutiny for legitimacy. Although many arrangements likely would pass the most
rigorous scrutiny, it seems equally clear that some would not. Some agreements are not the
product of arm’s-length bargaining, can rivet managers on short-term stock prices at the
destruction of long-term business value, and can misalign manager–shareholder interests. Yet
even such objectionable arrangements are immune from serious legal oversight. In theory, they
are open to judicial review under corporate law, but shareholders challenging pay contracts
face formidable procedural hurdles in derivative litigation and substantive obstacles from
corporation law’s business judgment rule and the anemic doctrine of waste. A new legal theory
would be useful to check board excesses in the population of clearly objectionable cases.
This Article explains why and how traditional contract law’s theory of unconscionability
should be used to create a modicum of judicial scrutiny to strike obnoxious pay contracts and
preserve legitimate ones. Under this proposal, pay contracts that are the product of managerial
domination of the process and formed on terms massively favoring the executive will be stricken.
This will follow direct shareholder lawsuits in state courts where the contract is made or
performed and applying that state’s contract law. This new legal theory circumvents today’s
dead-end route, where pay contracts are always upheld in derivative shareholder lawsuits
applying corporate law that sets no meaningful limits on executive pay. This proposal creates
new but modest pressure from sister states on Delaware to take greater responsibility for the
effects its production of corporate law has nationally.
For those outraged by lopsided corporate executive compensation, this Article offers an
appealing new legal theory of contractual unconscionability to police them. Those who see no or
few problems with contemporary pay arrangements, or who are outraged by federal regulatory
schemes like the Dodd–Frank Act, will welcome how this proposal is narrowly tailored using
common law to address the most obnoxious cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Executive pay has skyrocketed in recent decades, stoked by stock-based components
extolled under a three-pronged theoretical logic that proved problematic in practice. 1 Law and
economics’ optimal contracting theory promised that boards would fashion optimal pay
arrangements,2 but practice showed limits on this ideal.3 Finance theory’s hypothesis of efficient
markets, with stock price as a proxy for performance,4 overlooked gaps between short-term price
and long-term results.5 Corporate legal theory’s agency model proposed that stock-based pay
would align managerial incentives with shareholder interests,6 yet evidence shows that
corporations can create perverse incentives departing from that model.7 Law fueled the engine:
federal tax law encouraged stock-based pay; federal securities-disclosure law stimulated a
ratcheting up as executives sought raises to beat their peers; and Delaware, free of competition
from other states in setting the nation’s corporate laws, looked the other way.8
Given these infirmities, reformers propose increased shareholder power to strengthen
optimal contracting theory’s promise, redesigning contracts to focus on the long term, and
diminishing the alignment rationale of stock-based pay in favor of an executive-retention

1

See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for
―Compensation Discussion and Analysis,‖ 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 687 (2005) (―[M]any believed that significant stock
option grants would align shareholder and managerial interests . . . . Beliefs about the desirable effects of stock
options proved to be, at best, only partly correct . . . .‖);
Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 460–61 (2008) (noting that stock-based pay
was to ―align‖ managerial and shareholder interests but ―[t]he success of these measures is debatable, at best‖);
Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1226 (2006) (reviewing DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005)) (―The
theory of granting stock options is that they would align the interests of managers and shareholders . . . to reduce
agency costs. The reality has proven more problematic.‖).
2
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277–
78 (1986); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1999).
3
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
4
Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92
MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2101 (1994).
5
See Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law, 3 BERKELEY. BUS. L.J. 43, 54
(2005).
6
E.g., William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 179, 210 (2003) (―[S]tock and stock options . . . align managers’ incentives with those of stockholders . . . .‖);
Troy Paredes, The Importance of Corporate Law: Some Thoughts on Developing Equity Markets in Developing
Economies, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 401, 405 (2007) (arguing that stock options ―help align‖
recipient interests with shareholder interests).
7
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 981 n.129 (2009)
(―In theory, stock options . . . align manager and shareholder interests . . . . In practice . . . the differing time horizons
of managers and shareholders may give rise to conflicts of interest.‖); Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and
Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 136 (stock options ―may only roughly align pay with
performance‖).
8
See infra Part II.A.
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rationale.9 To fill the legal lacuna, the Dodd–Frank Act of 201010 partially responded to these
calls. It gave shareholders precatory votes on pay packages, enhanced the role of independent
directors in setting compensation levels, and expanded disclosure to include the ratio of top pay
to median pay and the relation of pay to firm performance.11 But the infirmities in executive pay
design remain, and these incremental legal reforms still rely on longstanding corporate
mechanisms that continue to insulate pay from judicial review for legitimacy. The contracts
remain subject to legal evaluation solely through the lens of corporate law, whose conventional
reposing of power in boards, along with boundless judicial deference, protects the arrangements
from judicial scrutiny.
It is time for a fresh approach to this problem: applying the contractual unconscionability
doctrine to test executive pay. This proposal is designed to appeal equally to those who believe
that executive compensation poses a broad systemic problem requiring wholesale reform, and to
those who believe that, at best, there are occasional excesses warranting targeted scrutiny. It will
appeal to those who perceive a systemic problem because it has no effect on any other enacted or
proposed reform. It will appeal to those who perceive only discrete problems because it is
precisely tailored to target only those special cases. Testing pay contracts using contract law
requires surmounting several hurdles that will assure a screening function so that only the most
odious contracts are exposed. Those hurdles are surmountable without requiring any action of
any legislative or regulatory body. The proposal requires only interested lawyers to identify a
proper case and proceed as this Article elaborates.12
It can be tempting to think of contractual unconscionability in terms of paternalistic
impulses intended to protect vulnerable types, such as consumers and employees, from
themselves and from predation at the hands of the unscrupulous. The standard modern
illustration appearing in contracts casebooks protects an impoverished and uneducated single
mother from a repugnant cross-collateral clause in a predatory consumer sales contract written in
boilerplate legalese.13 It may be difficult for the contemporary legal mind to transplant that
image to the rarified context of the corporate boardroom, where sophisticated directors advised
by experts hammer out a deal with an equally sophisticated and advised executive.
But the unconscionability doctrine is not limited to the context of judicial paternalism for
consumers and employees. It catches bargains that no fair-minded person would propose and no
9

See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915
(2010) (suggesting a framework for linking executive compensation to long-term performance and shareholder
value).
10
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 951–956, 124 Stat. 1376,
1899–906 (2010).
11
Id. §§ 951–953. For large banks, this Act is more directive, ordering federal regulators to adopt rules banning
contingent executive compensation that yields excessive pay or generates material risk of loss to the bank. Id. § 956.
12
This new legal theory applies to all executive employment contracts used in the for-profit corporate form of
business organization, including those providing compensation during employment and for severance upon
termination of employment. Much of this Article’s analysis focuses on stock-based pay contracts because they (a)
form the bulk of contemporary senior executive compensation and (b) present the most pernicious risks of
overreaching. The contractual analysis applies equally to executive employment contracts used in other
organizations not using stock-based pay, such as labor unions or not-for-profit corporations, though the doctrinal
hurdles would differ considerably.
13
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.D. Cir. 1965).
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rational person would assent to.14 Absent from the boardroom are shareholders who often
deserve greater protection from lopsided bargains than corporate law provides. Corporate law
works well when boards act in shareholders’ interests, consistent with optimal contracting
theory, or when boards depart from that model to violate corporate law duties stated in statutes or
judicially developed fiduciary law. But corporate law breaks down when managerial power
dominates board decision-making and results in executive pay contracts that are unconscionable;
yet, such power evades judicial review because of the inherent limits of corporate law. Those
inherent limits also pose several hurdles to testing executive pay by contractual
unconscionability, which is readily overcome in a proper case.
The first hurdle is the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law principle that can make
the law of the state of incorporation applicable to a corporation’s internal arrangements. 15 As
with officer-incentive devices authorized by boards to align managerial incentives with
shareholder interests, it is tempting to treat pay contracts as governed by the internal affairs
doctrine. That means corporate law applies—Delaware’s corporate law for most large U.S.
corporations. Under the doctrine of waste, even exorbitant pay contracts pass muster. But seeing
executive pay as an internal affair is not inevitable. It is also increasingly clear that many pay
contracts are not the internal alignment devices that they were once held out to be; rather, they
are employment agreements designed for retention.16 And because they are not matters of
internal affairs, they would be governed by the law of the state having the greatest interest.17
Managers could name Delaware as the choice of law by contract and maintain
Delaware’s quasi-monopoly that insulates the devices from judicial scrutiny. Yet contractual
choice-of-law clauses are but one factor relevant to determining what law governs a contract. 18
Other considerations include the contract’s place of formation and performance. In some cases,
that choice of law would not be dispositive against an assertion of contractual unconscionability,
since a declaration of contractual unconscionability can render all terms of a contract
unenforceable.19 In addition, Delaware contract law shows incrementally greater willingness to
police unconscionable bargains than its corporate law polices transactions amounting to waste. 20

14

E.g., Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231 (Mass. 1992).
See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005).
16
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9.
17
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971). There is also considerable debate about the
legal origins and legitimacy of the internal affairs doctrine. See infra notes 243–48 and accompanying text.
18
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (stating that the enforceability of choice of law
provision entails a two prong-test: (1) whether there is a reasonable relation between the contract and the
jurisdiction’s law chosen, and (2) absence of tension with a fundamental policy of the state whose law would apply
absent the clause).
19
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (explaining that courts faced with an unconscionable
contract term ―may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term . . . .‖); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 380–86 (2d ed. 1990) (noting judicial approaches
to declarations that contracts are invalid as a matter of public policy and how courts sometimes refuse to enforce any
part of a contract containing a repugnant clause along with mediating doctrines that enable striking the obnoxious
clause while preserving others).
20
See infra Part IV.
15

5

Shareholder challenges to pay contracts are habitually classified as derivative under
corporate law.21 This poses obstacles to judicial scrutiny. Boards have complete power to
manage a corporation, including its litigation.22 Shareholders suing on the corporation’s behalf,
in derivative cases, must first demand that a board redress the claim or show why it would be
futile to seek demand.23 Boards committed to a pay contract can rebuff such demands, and
corporate law’s test for demand futility defers to boards, thwarting shareholder claims. But just
as treating pay contracts as internal affairs is not inevitable, shareholder challenges to them can
be classified as direct. The primary remedy sought is rescission, and the theory of liability is that
the corporation lacked legal power to enter into the contract. This is known as ultra vires in
corporate law,24 and state corporate law statutes authorize these claims to be brought as direct
actions.25 Even if treated as derivative, the ultra vires assertion justifies excusing shareholder
demand on the corporation’s board as futile,26 and some challenges to executive-pay contracts
reach the merits even though they are classified as derivative.27
While these hurdles to enabling review of executive-pay arrangements under contract law
are high, the route is simpler and incrementally more likely to succeed than the dead-end route of
corporate law. The gauntlet should help persuade those who do not see executive pay as a serious
systemic problem (or skeptics about judicial scrutiny of board decisions) to tolerate the
prescription. Only the most egregious cases would qualify and be limited to this class of
claims.28 Those cases warrant such rebuke. Furthermore, consistent with the hypotheses that
managers respond to shareholder outrage29 and judicial shaming,30 even a few cases holding an

21

See Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 728 (Del. 2008); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 349 (Del.
1988); Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 779; Gordon, supra note 1, at 691 (―Suits challenging executive compensation
were deemed to be derivative, not direct, because the injury of putatively excessive compensation was to the
corporation itself or to all shareholders as a group.‖); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1902–04 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF
EXCESS (1991)).
22
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2006).
23
E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). Shareholders pursuing derivative lawsuits also generally
face additional technical requirements concerning standing and posting a bond as security for expenses. E.g., Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 712 (1974).
24
Ultra vires means beyond the power, and corporations are empowered to pursue lawful, but not unlawful,
activities. Claims that a contract is unconscionable can constitute a claim that it is unlawful and therefore beyond the
power of a corporation to form. See infra text accompanying notes 291–97.
25
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(1); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 203(a)(1) (McKinney 2003); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 3.04(b)(1) (2007); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1992); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires
Lives!: A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1352–55 (2001).
26
See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ. A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002).
27
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 46 (Del. 2006); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
249 (Del. 2000). These cases are analyzed towards the end of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 335–
50. Trial court opinions have also sometimes treated demand as futile in derivative cases challenging executive
compensation. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re
Viacom S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 602527/2005, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2891, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23,
2006).
28
Other sometimes-controversial corporate decisions, such as merger and acquisition activity, are clearly within the
internal-affairs doctrine and thus outside this Article’s prescriptive scope. See infra note 328.
29
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 64 (2004).
30
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009,
1103–04 (1997) (discussing how judicial shaming can constrain corporate managers to the interests of the
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executive-pay contract unconscionable would influence contract design and courts evaluating
their legality.
A well-known case involving The Walt Disney Company (―Disney‖) illustrates both
how corporate law handles such challenges and the incremental but potentially important
differences that would result using contract law. The board of Disney, a Delaware corporation
based in California, approved an employment contract with a top recruit following sloppy
procedures that cast doubt on whether the board took its duties seriously. The contract was made,
performed, and terminated in California. The executive worked for Disney for fourteen months
before the board fired him. The termination triggered a $140 million payout with features that
may have induced the executive to perform poorly, but not terribly, to receive the short-term
windfall. The Delaware court observed that the contract did not involve the internal affairs
doctrine, that board procedures were ―casual if not sloppy and perfunctory,‖ and that the pay was
―exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious.‖31 Despite the court calling the case ―troubling,‖32
shareholders ultimately lost the derivative suit.
Suppose instead that shareholders had sued the corporation and the executive in
California, asserting unconscionability and seeking rescission.33 California contract law applies
because the contract was made, performed, and terminated there. If classified as derivative, the
case would proceed without demand, as it did in Delaware, and shareholders could even credibly
assert the right to a direct action by stressing that they seek the remedy of rescission and
portraying the contract to be so egregious as to be unlawful and beyond the corporation’s power
to form. On substance, though $140 million may be a trifle in the dreamland of Hollywood or in
a company Disney’s size, it shocked even the Delaware courts. Their difficulty was comparing
the payout to the value of recruiting the executive, inducing the judges to defer under corporate
law’s business judgment rule. Judges testing the contract from a contract-law perspective would
not have been as inclined to hold their noses.
The Disney case usefully shows most of the differences between the corporate-law and
contract-law approaches. But the primary reason for discussing the case is because it is among
the very few cases challenging executive pay that surmounted the formidable corporate-law
obstacles to generating an appellate opinion on the subject. That yields a further justification for
this Article’s proposal. Currently, corporate law as it relates to executive compensation provides
essentially no limits. Within the common law on the subject, all the cases point in one direction:
more pay and on any terms managers can get boards to agree to. Most common-law subjects
produce a pool of important and interesting cases that wrestle with the complexities of business

shareholders). See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001)
(discussing shareholders’ response to judicial shaming).
31
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
32
Id.
33
When presenting a version of this paper to an audience that included many distinguished practicing lawyers
representing plaintiffs in corporate litigation, one informed me that she had originally filed a claim in the Disney
matter in California court that would have included claims of the kind I am describing. She reported that nearly
simultaneously another firm had filed the Disney action in Delaware. Ensuing procedural and strategic jockeying
among those and other interested law firms resulted in the Delaware case being pursued and the California case
abandoned.
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and social life. The pool enables discerning the boundaries between what is lawful and what is
not.
However, this is not the case with the law of corporate-executive compensation or the
doctrine of corporate waste. As a result, Disney is essentially the only contemporary corporatelaw case with which to compare the proposed contract-law approach. That is true despite
occasional compensation packages widely covered in the popular press that draw public outrage.
Examples include both astonishingly high compensation despite dismal corporate performance34
and lavish executive severance pay in light of events ranging from deep business disappointment
to the destruction of a company.35 It is possible to predict that some of these would fail the test of
contractual legitimacy described in this Article and be declared unconscionable.
There is also a reported appellate opinion in the case of Richard Grasso, once the CEO of
the New York Stock Exchange.36 He engineered a lavish, one-time payment of $140 million
from the Exchange when it was a not-for-profit corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
office of the New York Attorney General. When that office challenged the payout, it did so
relying heavily on corporate law principles set out in New York’s not-for-profit corporate statute.
The New York Court of Appeals, adopting the corporate law viewpoint contained in that statute,
found that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to pursue the kinds of corporate law
claims he asserted. Had the Attorney General and the court thought about the case from a
contract law perspective, instead of taking a corporate law approach, the opposite result may
have been possible.
Part I of this Article reviews the three-pronged theoretical logic that spawned the
skyrocketing of executive pay, especially stock-based pay. It recounts the classical theories of
optimal contracting, efficient markets, and incentive alignment, and then discusses limitations in
all three. This synthesis of the literature justifies skepticism about the virtues of prevailing
executive compensation practices. Part II explains how limited policing of pay contracts
facilitated their exponential growth despite backfires. It then reviews the new reform agenda to
fix these problems, identifying persistent shortcomings of the federal statutory and state
corporate law approaches. Part III celebrates common-law approaches to these challenges, but
34

Recent reported examples of astonishingly high executive compensation compared to performance include the
following: (1) Sanjay Jha (Motorola, Inc.), $104.4 million annually during a year when the company’s stock price
fell 71%; (2) Robert Iger (The Walt Disney Company), $51.1 million annually during a year when the company’s
profits fell 5% and an amount twice the payment the previous year; and (3) Kenneth Chenault (American Express
Company), $42.8 million annually during a year when the company’s profits fell 29%. See Kenneth R. Davis,
Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 420–21 (2010).
35
Recent reported examples of lavish severance despite business destruction include: (1) Robert Nardelli (Home
Depot, Inc.), $210 million, despite mediocre accomplishments during his stormy CEO tenure; (2) Stanley O’Neil
(Merrill Lynch Co.), $160 million, during the period when 2008’s financial crisis destroyed this once-powerful
brokerage firm, dooming it to a government-orchestrated takeover by Bank of America; and (3) Charles Prince
(Citigroup Inc.), $68 million, the year after 2008’s financial crisis decimated the once-mighty financial institution as
it relied on federal taxpayer bailouts to survive. See Davis, supra note 34, at 422, 460. In Prince’s case, a
shareholder derivative lawsuit in Delaware challenging the payment as waste survived preliminary challenges and is
pending. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). If it follows corporate-law
precedent, the shareholders will lose; if the contract-law analysis proposed in this Article is applied, they have a
good chance of winning.
36
People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008).
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notes how corporate law’s waste doctrine is anemic compared to contract law’s
unconscionability doctrine.
That sets the stage for Part IV’s new legal theory of contractual unconscionability to
promote judicial review of pay contracts. It encounters and surmounts all the hurdles to show
how applying contract law to pay contracts, rather than corporate law, would therapeutically and
incrementally expand the population of contracts that fail the test of judicial legitimacy. This
new legal theory would thus add considerable value to a field where both federal and state laws
have failed. In this limited and narrow way, state courts around the country applying their
contract laws could even add a small but much-needed bit of pressure on Delaware courts to
heed interests that its traditional corporate law may overlook.
I.

THREE PILLARS AND THEIR DIMINISHMENT

Executive compensation, especially stock-based components, has skyrocketed since the
1990s thanks to a three-pronged theoretical model whose limits were revealed beginning in the
early 2000s. Part I.A reviews the three theories, and Part I.B demonstrates their limits.
A.

CLASSICAL THEORY

The three-pronged theoretical model supporting growing executive compensation,
especially stock-based components, consisted of a vision of corporate boards forming optimal
contracts with managers, an assumption that stock market prices are good indicators of
managerial performance, and a belief that stock-based pay would better align managerial
incentives with shareholder interests.
1.

Optimal Contracting

In optimal contracting theory, shareholders are treated as principals and corporate
managers as agents.37 The theory notes how interests of principals and agents diverge. The costs
of controlling divergence and of the part that cannot be controlled are called agency costs. In
corporate contexts, agency costs are limited by markets, including the labor, capital, product and
corporate control markets.38 Divergence of interests between managers and shareholders can be
reduced by: (a) investing in monitoring devices, such as oversight, auditing, and internal
controls; (b) using bonding devices, such as commitments not to take certain actions; and (c)
creating interest-aligning incentives for agents, such as stocked-based pay contracts.39 In theory,
boards of directors, acting for shareholders and being accountable to them, can be counted on to
reduce agency costs. Compensation contracts that align manager incentives with shareholder
interests are one method.
2. Efficient Markets

37

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
38
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, ix (1993).
39
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37.
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To enable boards to reduce agency costs by arrangements that align manager incentives
with shareholder interests, scholars searched for a proxy to express the shareholder interest and
then tie manager incentives to it. For centuries, shareholders have been seen as interested in
maximization of firm profits and managerial performance was evaluated in those terms.
Beginning in the 1960s, it became fashionable to look beyond those terms to see stock market
price as a proxy for both the shareholder interest and firm value. This shift arose when theorists
developed a hypothesis that stock price incorporates all public information about a corporation,
reflecting profits and value.40
The principal–agent model and optimal contracting theory thus found a valuable
cognate.41 This efficient market hypothesis suggested stock prices reflect corporate performance
so as to provide a report card on managerial stewardship. Higher stock prices signal better
management.42 This assertion pointed to stock-based pay as an incentive device to induce
managers to focus on stock price, a barometer of their performance.43 Stock-based pay could
reward long-term investor wealth increases, even when focused on current stock price, because
―stock prices reflect the entire future stream of expected payments to shareholders, discounted to
present value.‖44 They could extend managerial time horizons to coincide with shareholders’
horizons.45
3.

Incentive Alignment

The idea that stock-based pay may align manager incentives with shareholder interests
dates back to the 1950s.46 But theories of optimal contracting and market efficiency that jelled by
the 1980s enabled an intensification of this assertion a decade later. This achievement is marked
by an influential paper by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy encouraging stock-based pay.47
While recognizing that agency costs are high and many devices, both market and contractual, are
available to contain such costs, these scholars argued that stock-based pay is most effective to
align manager incentives and shareholder interests.48

40

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
550 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970).
41
Fox, supra note 4, at 2101.
42
See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 867
(1983).
43
See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 678 (1988).
44
William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost
Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 417.
45
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 183 n.42.
46
See Arthur H. Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1953).
47
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225
(1990).
48
John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–27
(1986).
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Professors Jensen and Murphy were more concerned with compensation form than
amounts.49 Before they stimulated a shift, cash was the currency of executive compensation, not
stocks or options. They observed that cash compensation varied little with corporate
performance, as measured by stock price. They thought this a problem reflected in the agencycost model, showing manager–shareholder interests diverging. To limit divergence, and reduce
agency costs, Jensen and Murphy sought to link pay with performance, measured by stock price.
That meant making managers into shareholders, and CEOs into substantial shareholders. Stock
options and other stock-based pay were the solution.50
Deeper theory supposes managers are more risk averse51 than shareholders.52 That is
because managers have human capital (their earnings potential) tied up in their corporation, and
human capital is hard to diversify.53 Public shareholders have no human capital in the
corporation and can diversify financial risks by holding investments in many firms. Diversified
shareholders may prefer managers to pursue risky projects. So portrayed, shareholders have a
stronger risk appetite than managers, and some aggressive alignment mechanism, like stockbased pay, was the device to close that divergence.
Managers may also place greater weight on factors that put human capital at risk than on
financial rewards accompanying successful execution of risky projects. If so, the incentives must
be sufficiently strong to meet that asymmetric managerial orientation. 54 The prescription was to
mirror that orientation with asymmetrical payoffs—alignment devices that affirmatively
―reward[] success‖ and avoid ―penalizing failure.‖55 Stock options that make managers win big
on the upside and lose little on the downside became a virtue, providing the asymmetrical
payoffs their asymmetrical risk appetites warranted.
Most legal scholars avoided overstating the alignment case, noting stock-based pay as
one device among many to align managerial interests ―more closely‖ with shareholder
interests.56 They could help align these interests, but imperfectly. 57 Of course, everyone knows
49

Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
513, 609 (1993).
50
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37.
51
See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55
(1979).
52
See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 333
(1991) (―[M]anagers of large, publicly held firms may be more risk averse than shareholders would prefer.‖).
53
See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 37–38 (2000).
54
Id. at 40 (explaining that their representative analysis of the comparative risk appetites of shareholders and
managers meant prescribing ―a sufficiently large amount of stock options to offset inclinations to be too riskaverse‖).
55
Id. For some qualification on this prescription, see Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?,
54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 450 (2003).
56
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 277–78. Most scholars also knew of the limits of the alignment effects
of stock options. E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1490
(1989) (explaining how the relation of executive compensation to shareholder value is not robust and how stock
options do not perfectly align manager incentives with shareholder interests). Shareholders lose when price falls, but
managers do not—a misalignment accentuated by the common practice of boards repricing executive stock options
down when stock price falls. Stock options cannot align manager–shareholder risk appetites, since firm failure poses
greater losses to managers than to shareholders, no matter how many stock options they own. The only device that
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that agency costs cannot be reduced to zero. Stock-option contributions to agency-cost reduction
cannot be assured, and costs of stock-based pay can exceed the agency-cost reductions they
achieve. For example, stock options on exercise require share issuances that dilute claims of
other shareholders. It was understood that stock-based pay could solve some incentive problems
but create others.
Even so, there was exuberance among influential corporate law scholars to rivet
managers on stock price and make it the talisman of corporate performance—and stock-based
pay was a leading way to do it.58 There was also little doubt among prescribers that the primary
purposes of stock-based pay were to ―motivate management‖ and to ―align‖ recipient–
shareholder interests.59 Some said such pay extends managers’ time horizons beyond their
retirement, a value to the extent shareholder horizons are long. 60 Though the exact alignment
function was uncertain, it was always riveted on stock price, creating incentives to ―get stock
prices up.‖61 This motivation feature did not differ greatly from the alignment thesis, at least so
long as shareholders shared the ambition to ―get stock prices up.‖62
B.

REALITY CHECK

Beginning in the late 1990s and intensifying through the first decade of the twenty-first
century, reality exposed weaknesses in all three pillars of stock-based pay theory, and concerns
about skyrocketing executive pay emerged. The optimal contracting model and agency–principal
accounts work wonderfully in theory, but corporate governance realities make them often
inaccurate descriptions of the actual state of affairs. Managerial power can be too great in some
modern U.S. corporations to rely on the model’s envisioned contracting exercises.
The efficient market hypothesis, likewise elegant in theory, is an idealized picture of
market operation, different from reality. Stock markets produce prices that deviate in sustained

could potentially align the two would both compensate managers for success, as stock options were designed to do,
and punish failure, which they are not designed to do. E.g., Macey, supra note 52, at 333.
57
See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029,
1053 (1992) (explaining how stock options ―help[] align the manager’s interests to those of investors‖); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Shaping Force of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473, 1490 (1997)
(―[S]tock option grants . . . help align interests of managers and shareholders.‖).
58
E.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The ―Race to the Bottom‖ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919 (1982) (―Various compensation packages such as stock option plans,
which cause managers to share the risk bearing function with shareholders, provide managers with an incentive to
maximize shareholders’ wealth and keep stock prices high.‖).
59
Carney, supra note 44, at 416.
60
Id.
61
Thomas & Martin, supra note 53, at 37–38; see also Fischel, supra note 58, at 919 (discussing how market
mechanisms, such as stock-option plans, are designed to incentivize managers to ―keep stock prices high‖).
62
Stock option theory relied heavily not only the theory of efficient markets but also on other aspects of the larger
body of modern finance theory of which market efficiency is a part. In particular, proponents relied upon a tool of
modern finance theory to measure stock option value, the famous Black-Scholes option-pricing model. It says option
values increase in proportion to volatility of stock prices which, in turn, were thought a reliable measure of
fundamental business risk. Proponents prescribed that managers think about how risky their businesses were in
terms of how volatile its stock price was—and using stock options to increase their incentives to increase that
volatility.
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and substantial ways from any useful expression of underlying corporate performance. 63 These
theory–practice discrepancies diminished confidence that stock-based pay would align manager
incentives with shareholder interests—at least of long-term shareholder interests. They created
perverse incentives. Any one of these discoveries alone raises doubt about the efficacy of stockbased pay; their combined effect compounds the problem not only for stock-based pay but for
the amounts of executive compensation in all forms.
1. Suboptimal Contracting
Managerial power often proved too great for optimal contracting theory to work in
practice. True, market constraints, contracting devices, stock-exchange voting rules, and
regulatory and media oversight constrain managerial power to increase agency costs and extract
lucre from corporations. Managers abusing power to wrest excessive stock-based pay can
produce shareholder outrage. Shareholder outrage can lead to punishing misbehaving managers
and using the market for corporate control to oust them, by tender offer or proxy contest.
Managers may wish to avoid those consequences to protect reputations and associated human
capital (their earnings potential).
But managers have tools to camouflage misconduct, including thorough control of board
compensation committees, managing public disclosure, and other obfuscation.64 This point is not
new, of course. Professor Eisenberg highlighted the problem when stock-option alignment
enthusiasm incubated, along with optimal contracting and the efficient market theory. 65 He
explained that only in theory are compensation decisions made by independent committees
acting on independent outside expert advice.66 A corporation’s chief executive officer always has
a role in picking directors and supporting advisors and can dismiss noncompliant participants.
The CEO has a clear interest in increasing her or his compensation and that of lieutenants. It
looks like a governance process at work, but that can be an illusion.
Boards may honestly wish to align managerial incentives with shareholder interests and
think that stock-based pay does so, tying all to stock price and amounting to a valid exercise of
business judgment. Boards may likewise follow academic models and grant large numbers of
options intended to overcome what theory says is a significant difference in manager–
shareholder risk appetites.67 But Professors Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker warn of enduring
illusion in this possibility.68 Boards do not always negotiate with senior executives over these
matters. Optimal contracting theory assumes boards bargain with managers, acting for
shareholder interests to get optimal contracts. But those assumptions are sometimes wrong.

63

E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 981 & n.129 (―Because shareholders have a long-term investment horizon, they
would prefer risk-return policies that produce sustainable share price appreciation . . . . [S]tock options may give
management a short term investment horizon [to boost share price in non-sustainable ways].‖).
64
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 29, at 61–79.
65
Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 1491–92.
66
Id.
67
Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 137 (2003).
68
Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 3 at 833.
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Many scholars credit Professors Bebchuk and Fried with revealing contemporary limits
of the classical theory of stock-based pay as a solution to the classic agency-cost problem.69 For
example, Professor Stephen Bainbridge, reviewing their book, notes the traditional story
recounted above calling for reducing agency costs by aligning manager incentives with
shareholder interests, usually with stock-based pay.70 Bainbridge acknowledges that Bebchuk
and Fried made a good case that those schemes may not work, demonstrating how ―managerial
influence over the board . . . taints the process‖ and how the system supposed to reduce agency
costs is itself deeply infected with ―agency costs.‖71 Professor Eisenberg reviews the same
account, noting stock-based pay as the routine prescription to give managers incentives that align
with shareholder interests.72 He adds that Bebchuk and Fried showed that resulting compensation
is not linked to performance and concurs about why: ―incumbent CEOs often set their own
compensation behind a screen of compliant consultants, compliant compensation committees,
and compliant boards, all largely engaged in blowing smoke.‖73
Not all are convinced by Bebchuk and Fried’s argument that their managerial-power
thesis is a better way to explain observed practices than optimal contracting theory. Critics say
there may be good reasons, within optimal contracting theory, for executive compensation to
result in pay unrelated to business performance.74 Other scholars observe that the managerialpower thesis leaves room for the optimal contracting theory to explain much of observed
practice.75 Some empirical research identifies data suggesting that boards do engage in
meaningful bargaining with managers.76 In response, Bebchuk and Fried emphasize two points:
(1) the managerial-power thesis supplements, rather than displaces, optimal contracting theory;
and (2) there should be no presumption that optimal contracting theory is correct so that any rival
must disprove it to warrant recognition.77 On balance, there is at least some reason to doubt
optimal contracting theory’s utility in practice.
2.

Inefficient Markets

69

The problems they identify and associated criticism are of course much older. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell
Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting and Officer Fiduciary Duties
18 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-10, 2010), available at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1571368.
70
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1661–62 (2005)
(reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 29).
71
Id. at 1662.
72
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 167, 174–75 (2005).
73
Id. at 175.
74
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 29).
75
Gordon, supra note 1, at 676.
76
M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2007); M. Todd Henderson, Implicit Compensation (The Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M.
Olin
Law
&
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Working
Paper
No.
521
(2d
Series),
2010),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/521-th-compensation.pdf.
77
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 654
(2005).
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Another limit of the classic story is the difference between the efficient-capital-market
theory and actual stock-market practice.78 Even Judge Richard Posner, a longtime, staunch and
enduring devotee of the efficient-market theory, recognizes considerable limitations on the
model, which have particularly deleterious effects on stock-based pay.79 In discussing stockbased pay, Posner observed that ―capital markets are not as efficient at pricing securities as the
best estimate of their companies’ discounted present value as economists and finance theorists
used to think.‖80 While still believing that efficient-market theory has ―substantial explanatory
value,‖ Posner reviews insight from behavioral finance casting ―profound‖ doubt on its efficacy
concerning evaluating executive compensation, especially stock options.81
The as-if rationality that efficient-market theory supposes does not hold when investor
deviations from model behavior are systematic rather than random.82 Examples of systematic
departures from rationality include biases like loss aversion, manifested in greater reluctance to
sell losing than winning stocks, and demanding a larger risk premium to hold stocks compared to
bonds than risk models of investment diversification justify. They include excessive trading and
trading based on perceived stock price patterns. These systemic biases even plague professional
money managers. Sophisticated arbitrageurs cannot eliminate them since there are not always
good substitutes for mispriced stocks and there is no assurance that market errors will be
corrected before an arbitrage position must be closed out.
The result is sustained deviations between stock price and business value. Even if the
efficient market theory makes more modest claims, like price impounds public information, the
reality of market behavior impoverishes stock-based pay as a way to tie managerial pay to
managerial performance or to align managerial incentives with shareholder interests. True, as
Posner stresses, the force of these deviations is debated and their policy implications contestable.
But as Poser concludes, existing knowledge supports criticism about the prevailing structure, and
amount, of executive compensation.83 Evidence shows how stock price movements that
determine compensation ―may not be reliable estimates of underlying values, and hence of
CEOs’ contribution to those values.‖84
These infirmities in efficient-market theory underscore the difference between the short
term and long term. The model supposes there is no difference because short-term stock prices,
impounding all public information, represent a reliable proxy for long-term business value. But
that is contestable when stock prices are fueled by speculative optimism. Short-term prices can
78

See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 852–53 (1992).
79
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58
DUKE L.J. 1013, 1036–38. (2009).
80
Id. at 1028–29.
81
Id. at 1036.
82
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767,
773–80 (2002).
83
Posner, supra note 79, at 1036–38.
84
Id. at 1041. Posner adds that the ―insidious effect‖ of this problem was acute in the 2008 financial crisis after
managers were encouraged to ride the preceding market bubble through its bursting, preferring short-term high stock
prices to medium- or long-term business value. Id.
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be inflated compared to long-term business value.85 Based on the technology bubble of the late
1990s, there is a case that problems with the efficient-market theory make stock-based pay
problematic, apart from the relative accuracy of optimal contracting theory versus the
managerial-power thesis. It is possible, amid inefficient market bubbles, that shareholder
interests are so riveted on short-term stock price that short-term, stock-based pay perfectly aligns
shareholder–manager interests—though short-term price and long-term value differ.86
But what of shareholders not interested in short-term price drops compared to long-term
business value? There may be a stalemate between proponents of the classical theories
supporting stock-based pay and those emphasizing reality checks. Proponents still hold out hope
for tenets such as optimal contracting and efficient markets while skeptics stress the inherent
limits of these models. Assuming shareholder interest promotion is the goal, it is vital whether
the contending position can even agree about which shareholder interests matter.87 Shareholders
may be arrayed on a highly delineated range of time horizons, from minute-to-minute short-term
day traders fastened on price fluctuations to long-term devotees of fundamental value. The
populations may vary with different corporations and economic climates. With efficient markets,
this short-term–long-term dichotomy would not exist. But with imperfectly efficient markets, the
difference can be vast.
That difference, along with managerial incentives to fasten on short-term price, rather
than long-term value, has spawned three problems, which will be analyzed in the next Subpart as
evidence of misaligned incentives: inclining managers to speculative short-term projects that
sacrifice long-term investment, encouraging earnings manipulation and accounting fraud, and
overdoing stock repurchases as opposed to paying cash dividends. None of those should be
possible if stock markets are efficient, where stock price reflects all public information and are
proxies for corporate or managerial performance. Even erstwhile, champions of stock-based pay,
and the efficient-market theory used to justify it, see that stock prices can be inflated.88
Accordingly, it is no longer correct to say that stock-based pay pinned to the short term gives
managers incentives to increase shareholder or corporate value; rather, it gives them incentives to
increase short-term stock price.
3.

Misaligned Incentives

It seems relatively widely recognized that stock-based pay does not always work as well
to align manager incentives with shareholder interests as the theory predicted.89 It creates three
85

Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J.
CORP. L. 721, 724–25 (2005).
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Id. Professor Bolton’s paper explains that this problem is exacerbated by how corporate fiduciary duties run to
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BUS. REV. 55, 67 (2006).
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CORP. FIN., Winter 2002, at 41, 42–43.
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Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here,
What Are the Problems, and How To Fix Them 81–82 (Harvard Bus. Sch. NOM Research Paper No. 04-28, 2004),
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (―[I]ncentives based on stock options . . . failed to align executives’
interests comprehensively with those of their firms in this period of generally overvalued equity.‖).

16

perverse incentives for managers not aligned with the interests of shareholders other than
speculative short-term ones. The first and most-cited problem is that stock-based pay riveted
manager attention on current stock price, not long-term business value. In contrast, the interests
of most shareholders focus on long-term business value, not short-term stock price.90 Second, the
result of that fixation is managerial temptation towards manipulation and distorting financial
records and accounting, thus skewing information in ways antagonistic to most shareholder
interests.91 Third, the incentives also slant managers away from paying cash dividends to
stockholders and towards stock repurchases because dividends are not paid on stock options and
cash repurchases drive up stock price.92 That likewise may be an interest shared by some, but not
all, shareholders.
These problems arise in part because of poor pay contract design. For example,
misalignment occurs when stock options make managerial upside potential enormous and
downside risk minimal.93 Stock options either pay off big or expire worthless, costing managers
little on the downside and encouraging greater risk taking than many shareholders prefer. Even
when stock prices fall below set exercise prices, the once-common board practice of cutting the
exercise price—or issuing new options—creates value for option-holding managers not available
to any shareholder. That undercuts manager–shareholder-interest alignment.94
Options vest within a few years and can be exercised upon vesting for up to ten years,
and managers tend promptly to liquidate them within the short term. The shorter the time until
stock options vest and become exercisable, the shorter managerial focus becomes. At brief
intervals, options ―turbocharge‖ managerial fixation on short-term price that can misalign
manager–shareholder interests on time horizons and, worse, induce pathological managerial
obsession with stock price.95 That tempts managers not only to succumb to financial
misreporting and slanted capital allocations but creates incentives for them to manipulate the
timing of disclosure to shareholders—disclosing news likely to reduce stock price right before
exercise prices are set and disclosing news likely to increase stock price right before exercising.
Several categories of costs arise from these misalignments. First, stock-based pay is more
costly than an equivalent amount of cash for a corporation.96 To a manager, the choice between
one million dollars in cash and stock options with an estimated value of one million dollars is
90
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easy—take the cash, since it offers liquidity and a certain value while the stock option is illiquid
and of uncertain value. Second, the devices shift claims on corporate value from shareholders to
managers, evidenced by the dilution of other shareholders when managers exercise options for
shares. Third, any resulting financial misreporting, fraud, or disclosure manipulation risks capital
misallocations. Fourth, pay contracts can inject volatility into stock market prices, skewing what
could be a useful signal of corporate performance, as under efficient-market theory.97
Accordingly, it is difficult to embrace the alignment thesis of stock-based pay contracts.
That is due to design that rivets managerial attention on the short-term and skewed incentives
towards financial manipulation. It is also difficult because it is impossible to delineate a
particular sort of shareholder with which any alignment prescription can be made.
II.

FROM NEGLECT TO REFORM

Executive pay has skyrocketed along with stock-based components. From the 1980s to
early 2000s, there was essentially no bulwark against excess. With the empirical discovery of
limitations on the model, the new reform agenda offers many proposals to fill this gap. The
following reviews the historical lack of oversight and highlights some approaches to providing it,
including partial reforms appearing in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, prescribing independent
director oversight of top pay contracts, enhanced disclosure, and periodic but nonbinding
shareholder votes on them.
A.

LIMITED HISTORICAL POLICING

Academics on balance supported growth in executive pay, especially stock-based
components, with only a minority of scholars raising serious doubt. 98 Many boards of directors
became supine and compliant, increasingly relying upon outside executive-compensation
consultants and benchmarking against peers in exercises that ratcheted up executive pay,
especially stock option components.
At best, state corporate law, in Delaware99 or elsewhere,100 provided limited supervision.
Delaware, in particular, had shifted its standard for judicial review of executive compensation
97

That is partly because stock options are often valued using a cognate of efficient market theory, which says stock
options increase in value in proportion to the volatility of the underlying stock price—a model that, if managers
believe it, gives them incentives to increase stock price volatility. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 53, at 41
(―Valuing a stock option requires using the Black-Scholes formula and is not an intuitive process.‖); supra note 62.
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without regard to the corporation’s risk profile. It is difficult to see how that is in the interest of most shareholders.
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from something resembling serious examination to the most deferential position possible.101 This
relaxed waste standard, combined with the business judgment rule, veneration of formal board
independence, and the endorsement of special litigation committees in derivative litigation, took
Delaware courts and corporate law largely out of the policing picture. 102 This relaxation
coincided with growing recognition that Delaware no longer competed with other states in the
market for corporate charters, so that its production of corporate law was not necessarily
constrained by competition from other states.103
At the federal level, securities regulators’ efforts resulted only in mandating more
disclosure (a feature continued in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010).104 While potentially useful,
some of these rules, such as requiring comparisons of compensation at peer companies, made the
practice of benchmarking more tempting and contributed to pay ratcheting up. Tax policy,
though occasionally ambivalent, created additional incentives for corporations to use stock-based
pay, rather than perform any policing function.105 Even the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,106 responding
to scandals of the early 2000s with some link to stock-based pay, did nothing to address
problems of misaligned incentives arising from inefficient markets and suboptimal
contracting.107 Though some scholars contend that the declining competition for Delaware from
other states has been replaced by an enduring threat of preemption from the federal
government,108 these modest incursions are slight,109 and Delaware retains enormous leeway in
designing corporate law for national use.
As stock-based pay began to proliferate, it was an accident of accounting history that
standards did not require stock options to be treated as an expense on an income statement. That
treatment contributed to corporate America’s appetite for using this form of compensation. In
response, accounting standard setters sought to require recording option compensation as
expenses, but business interests and politicians in Congress resisted mightily. 110 After a decades
of fighting and the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, standard setters achieved some reporting
transparency. But that happened after stock-based pay had penetrated corporate culture so
pervasively that the measures were too little too late to offer much of a policing function. As a
group, auditors did not keep up with the inherent risks of earnings management that stock-based
pay created. Many were co-opted by management.111
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With no legal oversight of executive compensation, the combination of public outrage,
media pressure, and financial crisis that began in 2008 conspired to sharpen attention on the
question. That induced some market correction, suggested by evidence of changes in stockbased-pay practices at some companies.112 Examples include increased used of contract
provisions requiring disgorging amounts later deemed excessive under so-called ―claw-back‖
provisions.113 Some see the incremental shift in board practices as a sign of a self-correcting
governance program.114 Some scholars discern a flicker of a move within Delaware corporate
law in response,115 focusing on officer fiduciary duties, though this remains inchoate.116 As
discussed next, a new reform agenda emerged from this public outrage, leading to a few new
provisions addressing executive compensation in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, but leaving much
of the agenda incomplete and sustaining, rather than resolving, the debate.
B. THE NEW REFORM AGENDA
The three-pronged theoretical logic that promoted skyrocketing executive compensation,
including its stock-based components, is under renovation. Optimal contracting theory retains
supporters who believe that boards are self-correcting, though others prescribe greater disclosure
or expanding shareholder voice in corporate governance. Most seem to agree that there are
differences between short-term price and long-term value, and that stock-based pay should be
redesigned to emphasize the latter. Many still believe in the possibility of using stock-based pay
to align manager incentives with shareholder interests. But that prospect’s dubiousness opens up
new ways to justify the device. An alternative is that stock-based pay can be valuable to
corporations to attract and retain scarce executive talent. The following discusses leading aspects
of each point, drawing two implications. The first is whether the surgery on stock-based-pay
redesign will prove worthwhile or whether a better prescription is to abolish it.117 The second,
recognizing abolition as unlikely both practically and politically, is the continuing absence of
judicial scrutiny of stock-based pay, to which Part III of this Article turns.
1. Reoptimizing Contracting
An early prescription to police stock-based pay was offered by Greaf Crystal, a
compensation expert, who suggested corporate boards use independent consultants and
compensation committees staffed with fully informed independent directors.118 Though scholars
continue to debate whether observed pay practices comport with optimal contracting theory or
112
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the managerial-power thesis, there is little doubt that merely having such consultants and
committees does not promote an air-tight arrangement in which actual bargaining occurs. It is
not obvious that continuing to emphasize board independence in a formal legal sense promotes
serious arm’s-length contracting, given the variety of structural, cognitive, and other biases that
make directors more sympathetic and accountable to senior executives than to public
shareholders.119 Accordingly, new provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 prescribing
independent-board-committee oversight of top-executive pay, while potentially incrementally
helpful, are not highly likely to succeed.120
Reinvigorating the optimal contracting story requires intensifying the accountability of
directors engaged in compensation setting. They must have incentives, aligned with stockholder
interests, to conduct arm’s-length bargaining. That leads to a standard prescription to increase
shareholder voice in the boardroom. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 takes an incremental step of
requiring periodic shareholder votes on top pay, though these are expressly not binding and do
not expressly alter board fiduciary duties.121 While this process may increase visibility of pay
and intensify board oversight, the precatory nature of the vote and its infrequency may dull its
teeth.
Enhanced disclosure is the standard approach to reforming securities regulation generally
and executive compensation practices in particular.122 The Dodd–Frank Act increases disclosure
to address academic criticism and public outrage concerning executive compensation. Regarding
academic criticism, Dodd–Frank requires disclosure relating executive pay to enterprise
performance, a clarion cry of pay critics for a decade.123 Regarding public outrage, the Act
requires stating and relating in a ratio the amounts of the CEO’s pay to the pay of the company’s
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median worker.124 Companies also must disclose whether top executives owning company stock
are allowed to hedge against declines in the stock price.125 This is important because even stockbased pay designed to induce optimal incentives can be circumvented with hedges.
This tried-and-true approach to corporate regulation using disclosure is heralded by
some.126 Indeed, there has long been extensive disclosure of pay contracts and other executivecompensation arrangements, including the terms of stock-option plans. But these can be buried
in dense documents or reams of paper that only a handful of market professionals digest. That
may be enough to make the information public within the meaning of efficient-market theory and
reflected in stock price. But disclosure serves additional functions, including as a check on board
and management, generating outrage when pay is exorbitant and thus deterring excess. 127 A new
disclosure rule in the Dodd–Frank Act expressing the ratio of top to median pay at a company
may inflame public outrage and may provide that check. 128
Or the rule could backfire. For example, spotlighting the ratio of top-to-median pay may
have surprising political repercussions. It may merely intensify existing polarity in the populace
dividing those outraged by great income disparities between workers and managers and those
who assume big pay rewards hard work. It is not always possible to use graphic or narrative
information relating pay to performance and the result may be less meaningful than it sounds. In
fact, other proponents of disclosure as a tonic prescribed disclosing very different information.
They would require greater detail concerning the degree to which pay contracts are designed to
orient managers on shorter versus longer-term horizons.129 Furthermore, of course, the limits of
public corporate disclosure are well known and it is infeasible to compel effective disclosure of
all useful information.130 Ultimately, critics counter that vesting more power in shareholders will
exacerbate—not solve—problems created by stock option short-term riveting because some
influential shareholders prefer the short-term focus.131
Whatever value Dodd–Frank may add, and appreciating how controversial even these
incremental steps are, it is notable that Congress chose a few among many of a broader range of
reform proposals in circulation. These include giving shareholders access to the corporate
director ballot (something the Act merely directs the SEC to evaluate), increasing their power to
remove directors, eliminating staggered boards, and increasing shareholder power to amend
corporate charters and by-laws establishing corporate-governance procedures.132 Some call for
making proxy fights easier for shareholders to wage133 by reimbursing them for expenses, just as
corporations absorb expenses of managerial proxy campaigns. The Dodd–Frank Act left these
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more rigorous exercises out. It remains to be seen what the SEC will do about shareholder proxy
access. But whatever the SEC does, it can have at most an indirect effect on executive pay.
Yet others say increasing marginal income-tax rates on high-income earners, targeted to
stock-based pay, would police these contracts more effectively.134 That may be true. But that
prescriptive approach has a long pedigree.135 And Congress has done precisely the opposite in its
tax laws, encouraging stock-based pay under the rubric of ―incentive compensation.‖136 Political
pressure against changing that law makes it unwise to rely upon Congressional action.
A final reform suggestion equips independent and impartial arbiters with power to review
pay contracts for legitimacy. Federal law did that for banks receiving bailout funds during the
financial crisis, enlisting Kenneth R. Feinberg to set the pay of twenty-five top managers at
seven companies. The Dodd–Frank Act comes close to that for a small group of large banks,
requiring federal-bank regulators to prohibit contingent-pay arrangements that can yield
excessive compensation or risk material bank losses.137 Corporations could also create
shareholder compensation committees to serve this role.138
It is possible to imagine ways of reforming Delaware corporate law and stimulating
Delaware’s judiciary to provide this supervision, especially a newly found focus on the fiduciary
duties of officers themselves as distinct from directors.139 Yet Delaware’s law regulating
shareholder suits precludes many claims, and its corporate law of director duties and waste has
not offered a rigorous forum for judicial review. The judicial-scrutiny avenue should not be
neglected, however, and Part III of this Article offers the corrective of substantive contract-law
review conducted by courts other than Delaware’s, in addition to whatever reinvigoration of
Delaware corporate law courts may adopt.
2.

Retention as the Goal.

Many scholars continue to hope that properly designed stock-based pay can help align
managerial incentives with shareholder interests, especially of long-term shareholders.140
Experience casts doubt about such hopes, however. True, the Dodd–Frank Act’s enhanced board
independence, shareholder voting, and disclosure imply probable boardroom changes are
indicated. Some boards may learn from past mistakes. But that is not inevitable. In the academic
literature, the primary rationale offered for stock-based pay was aligning manager incentives
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with shareholder interests. If that were the only rationale, and if the hopeful are wrong and there
is less realistic chance that stock-based pay can provide such alignment, there would be a strong
case for abolishing stock-based pay.141
Alternatively, stock-based pay can be justified on grounds other than alignment and
debate over its capacity to promote alignment rendered moot. Even while academics emphasized
alignment as the rationale, companies using stock-based pay declared their purpose as attracting
and retaining managers.142 Many managers come to command extraordinary information about
an enterprise, and many are intensely interested in lateral moves. 143 Retaining them can be
valuable to a corporation and its shareholders. There may be few better ways to induce retention
than dangling valuable stock options that vest in the future.144 Before the stock-based pay boom
that began in the 1990s, the principal rationale of stock-based pay dating to the 1950s was
executive retention.145
Though recognizing the retention rationale, some stock-based pay skeptics doubt its
utility for that purpose. They note that competing companies outbid the value of equity interests
left on the table by inducing managers to move through the device of the ―golden hello.‖146 Some
companies give stock options after terminating an executive, not to retain or align. 147 Still, it
appears increasingly clear that corporate managers and scholars alike consider the rationale of
attraction and retention to be more legitimate and credible for stock-based pay than the
debilitated alignment rationale.
3.

Long Term, Not Short Term

Following the consensus that stock-based pay failures of recent decades were due to
perverse riveting on short-term stock price, an equal consensus appears to reform the device to
focus on long-term business value. Professor Bratton notes that the three largest subcategories of
costs stock-based pay poses from its short-term riveting (deferred investment, earnings
management, and excessive share buybacks compared to dividends) can be mitigated by ―[l]ongterm restraints on the alienation of equity awards.‖148 Judge Posner proposes requiring ―that a
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substantial share of executive compensation be backloaded and tied to the future performance of
the firm.‖149
This prescription has a long pedigree.150 As discussed above, criticism of stock-based pay
focuses heavily on its short-term rivet effect, implying that redesign for the long-term would be a
fitting remedy.151 There may be reason to believe that boards will act on the recommendation and
adhere to a long-term design focus faithfully. The information environment has changed. Boards
know the limits of the alignment thesis and limits of stock market pricing. They know the
perverse incentives that short-term stock-based pay creates. It may be helpful to give
shareholders more influence over boards to promote accountability and fidelity to the new
reform agenda’s focus on long-term pay contracts. But it is vital to appreciate that shareholders
are not homogenous and the slogan of ―empowering shareholders‖ overlooks how different the
interests of different shareholders can be, ranging from those interested in minute-by-minute
stock price changes to those interested in intrinsic value measured years into the future.
In light of these concerns in the new reform agenda, leading scholars such as Professors
Bebhuk and Fried and Professor Romano prescribe an integrated redesign of pay contracts. All
struggle to promote long-term manager orientations. For example, historically, stock options
have usually vested within a couple of years and are immediately exercisable then. That fixes
attention on the short term. But there is no reason the vesting and exercisability have to happen
simultaneously.152 Options could vest after three years, providing pay and retention incentives.
But they could be made exercisable for the stock only years after vesting. Managers would have
less incentive to rivet on short-term stock price and more in stock price years later. The required
time before exercisability should be predetermined and lengthy. It should not be a function of
events that a manager can control, like a recipient’s retirement.153 That would rivet attention on
stock price during the preretirement period, sustaining all known problems with such short-term
focus. Equally bad, it can encourage premature retirement, defeating the newly important
retention rationale of stock-based pay.154
Redesign must lengthen managerial time horizons but appreciate managerial needs for
liquidity and diversification. Long-term alienation restraints lengthen managerial horizons,
reducing incentives to focus on short-term price. But restraints lower stock-option value to
managers by reducing liquidity and capacity for diversification. Too much equity from
149
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excessively tight constraints makes managers too undiversified compared to many outside
shareholders; too little makes the recipient a mere ―implicit debt holder,‖ reliant on the firm for
salary, with incentives to reduce risk.155 A modulated restraints–release design pursues the
optimal by combining long-term constraints with periodic releases.156 An alternative would
impose long-term restraints in exchange for granting more stock options to increase aggregate
value to recipients. But that raises the specter of further upward pressure on total
compensation.157 Another alternative would impose minimum equity holdings. Yet that can
exacerbate the problem because when too high, managers may be more risk-averse than many
outside diversified shareholders prefer.158
If separating the vesting and exercisability dates and capping periodic option exercises
were the only redesign changes made, problems would remain for incentives managers have to
time and manage the terms of grant dates and exercise dates. Managers picking grant and
exercise dates exploit inside information and even shape disclosure policy to influence stock
price, reducing it just before grant dates and raising it just before exercise dates.159 To prevent
this mischief requires eliminating associated discretion and current timing practices.160
Eliminating discretion over grant exercise dates would curtail managers abusing information
advantages. Proponents of stock-based pay concur that long-term alienation restraints reduce
managerial temptation to manipulate short-term stock price.161 Locking in grant dates and
restricting discretion over exercise programs reinforce that benefit. It is more difficult to
manipulate information flows under these constraints and more difficult to manipulate long-term
than short-term accounting and stock-price effects.162
But these restrictions will not eliminate the potential for incentives for financial or
accounting manipulation, though they would moderate them and their significance. It may be
more difficult to manipulate information and accounting results over long periods than short
periods, but it is possible. Familiar gimmicks to manipulate short-term results, to boost current
profits, include premature revenue recognition and capitalization of expenses. That reduces
profits reported later. An efficient stock market should see through such charades; actual stock
markets do not. But a shift to the medium or long term, especially by staggering the alienability
of stock options, only shifts the game’s focus. For example, if stock-option values peak in year
six, managers have an incentive to allocate profits to year six. Schedules of revenue recognition
and expense allocation can be devised to facilitate just that. The staggered release schedule may
reduce this manipulation incentive, but it cannot eliminate it.
155
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Many other problems and proposed solutions appear, and delineating them all is beyond
this Article’s scope. But highlighting one will suffice to illustrate the challenge and stimulate
thought concerning whether to abolish stock-based pay or at least develop a way to adapt a basic
contract-law doctrine to police them. Vital to any redesign is a device to prevent managerial
evasion of intended effects. Whatever design stock-based pay assumes and whatever alignment,
retention, or other virtues are provided, managers can use side deals to reverse the effects.
Managers can engage in short sales or sign-swap agreements that have the effect of liquidating or
altering the position equity interests ordinarily represent. Even stock-pay proponents who
generally favor market and private solutions to governance challenges suggest willingness to
prescribe that law ban such end-runs.163 That consensus explains provisions in the Dodd–Frank
Act that require companies to disclose whether managers owning stock are permitted to hedge
against stock price declines.164 But that disclosure is not the same thing as a policy prohibiting it,
of course.
C.

THE CASE FOR ABOLITION

The new reform agenda’s emphasis on stock-based-pay-contract redesign amounts to
radical surgery that raises a separate question: whether these devices are worth redesigning or
whether they should be abolished. To read some accounts of stock-based pay, it’s a wonder how
corporations achieved prosperity for the hundreds of years before it was so well theorized that
they proliferated throughout corporate America. Yet, are they vital? Would corporate America or
the U.S. economy be worse off without these devices? Berkshire Hathaway, run by noted
investor–manager Warren Buffett, has never paid managers using stocks or options, and that
company is among the largest and most-respected in the world.165 Is abolishing stock-based pay,
voluntarily by corporations or mandatorily by regulation, a damnable prescription? Setting aside
the political obstacles to any such prescription, it’s worth pausing to consider just how vital
stock-based pay is, especially for retention, now that it assumes greater importance as a credible
rationale. What are the alternatives and how do they compare in complexity and cost?
Several devices readily present themselves as retention tools—and some may promote
alignment as well or better than stock options or the like. For senior executives, including CEOs,
examples are cash salary and other compensation (like cash bonuses, pension, and severance),
plus non-compete agreements. For other top managers, the devices include opportunities for
advancement, staffing and reporting arrangements, and titles. All these can be designed to
promote retention, and some can even be designed to help align managerial incentives with
shareholder interests, such as by making some bonuses tied to business-unit performance under
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that manager’s control. Most are relatively cheap compared to stock-based pay. They are also
simpler in that they present fewer risks of creating unintended perverse incentives.
Opponents of abolition, including Judge Posner, note that stock-based pay can provide
some alignment effects, though they were oversold and are a ―clumsy instrument for
incentivizing managers.‖166 Abolitionists emphasize those weak alignment benefits, the
irredeemably impaired contracting process, and how riveting on shareholder wealth, short or
long term, has ―corrosive effects.‖167 Even the best redesign proposals show that no stock-based
pay contract will avoid presenting trade-offs and complexities. Designing effective pay contracts
is a Herculean task because of inherent trade-offs.
As Professor Bratton explains, these trade-offs arise because stock-based pay is not
sensible if conceived of merely as compensation.168 For corporations and shareholders,
compensation, in whatever amount, is cheaper using cash than stock. Stock-based pay must offer
something more than return for labor. It must provide incentives cash does not. In the standard
story, those unique incentives are some form of alignment between managerial and shareholder
interests. Yet those incentives can only be maximized by imposing long-term alienation
restraints that reduce managerial assessments of option value. The upshot is inherent trade-offs.
An important incentive that affects stock-based pay can provide better than cash is to
induce managers to remain employed. Boards that design stock-based pay solely for the purpose
of retention can skip the incentives alignment angst and set the level and form of options as
required to induce valuable managers to stick around, keeping their human capital in place.
Although that provides a more credible rationale to continue to use stock-based pay, and against
abolition, it does not eliminate difficulties or trade-offs. Even if the purpose is to give managers
an incentive to remain with the corporation, effects can be a variety of other skewed incentives.
Changing the rationale does not change the device or related design challenges. But it does
support changing the conception of the legal lens used to evaluate option-pay legitimacy—a shift
from corporate law to contract law.
III.

OLD AND NEW COMMON-LAW TOOLS

One disadvantage to statutory or regulatory responses to corporate-governance challenges
is their inherently one-size-fits-all quality. Whether in the original securities-law statutes or
updates like Sarbanes–Oxley or Dodd–Frank, Congress adopts laws of general applicability.
That is true whether they work better or worse for the wide variety of corporate settings they
address. Broad general principles like disclosure and materiality work well under such a model.
But more intricate matters, such as control and supervision of accounting systems or
compensation packages, are less amenable to that kind of regulation. Apart from potentially
awkward fit and costliness, the result is a watering down of a law’s strength that misses the target
of the most egregious abuses. In contrast, common law’s case-by-case approach is precisely
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Bratton, supra note 87, at 57–59.

28

targeted and tailored. It catches the egregious cases and yields to the wide range of legitimate
practices.
Another advantage of common law is how it usually generates a population of resolved
cases that enables stating doctrines that show the boundaries between legal categories, including
between what is legitimate and what is unlawful. The corporate doctrine of waste does not share
that feature, especially not concerning executive-compensation decisions. The cases all suggest
that essentially anything goes, and that does not yield a useful body of case law. If contractunconscionability law applied, a body of cases with some variety would emerge, with some
bargains found illegal while the majority would be upheld. The population of cases would draw
on and reflect legitimate business and legal norms, which lawyers and business people would in
turn use to make lawful arrangements and eschew unlawful ones. In short, the common law of
contracts has a capacity to target and catch what is unmatched by federal securities statutes or
state corporation law.
This Part paves the way to the Article’s proposal by exploring the doctrines of waste and
unconscionability. It shows that, in theory, corporate law’s waste doctrine should be more
demanding than contract’s unconscionability doctrine but that the reverse is true in practice.
Discussion then reconciles the two doctrines and shows the appeal of contract law to test the
legitimacy of pay contracts. The next Part explicates the route to make that happen and illustrates
the opposing results.
A.

CORPORATE WASTE

Corporate law vests all powers, including the hiring and compensation of officers, in the
board of directors,169 with occasional requirements or opportunities for shareholder input.170
Boards owe corporations and their shareholders duties of care, presumed discharged under the
business judgment rule, and of loyalty, easily met by satisfying formal independence
requirements.171 Corporate-law judges defer overwhelmingly to board decisions within their
statutory powers. In theory, boards are not authorized to engage in transactions that constitute a
waste of corporate assets, though in practice, judicial findings of corporate waste are rare. 172
Even when palpable waste appears, corporate law insulates related decisions from judicial
review by limiting shareholder power to assert legal rights on behalf of the corporation.173
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A successful claim that a corporate payment constitutes waste, and is therefore
unprotected by the business judgment rule, requires a showing ―that no reasonable [business
person] could find that adequate consideration had been supplied for the payment.‖174 In
practice, that test requires showing the functional equivalent of a gift of corporate assets.175
Examples are monthly installment payments to a corporation’s former president’s wife because
the payments were gratuitous,176 generating nothing for the corporation in return and motivated
solely by sentiment. Similarly, naked bonuses that amount to retroactive salary increases lack
consideration absent terms limiting payments according to achieving contract-like objectives.177
As a result of functionally equating waste with gifts, massive salaries are outside the
doctrine of waste because they so easily meet a long-standing test the Supreme Court stated in
1933 that defines ―waste‖ as occurring when there is ―no relation‖ between what the corporation
gives and gets.178 Delaware courts have generally followed this statement of the doctrine of
corporate waste.179 Even the strictest Delaware Supreme Court opinions, written in the 1950s
(and since fallen into desuetude), did not require much.180 Examples, both focused on stockoption pay, suggest the corporation must receive something in exchange and that stock options
exercisable quickly after issuance that do not require continuing employment fail that test.181 But
even such a test can readily be satisfied by showing some relationship between value given and
benefit received182 or, even easier, relying upon approval by a disinterested board coupled with
shareholder ratification.183
Whether under that old standard or current articulations, it is difficult for shareholders to
win claims of corporate waste in any context, including executive compensation. It is nearly
impossible to assert waste as a basis to challenge a merger184 or a corporation’s dividend
policy.185 Even as to compensation claims, success is rare when adequate consideration can be
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found solely from the possibility that an executive may in the future be available to provide
consulting services to the corporation.186
Corporate law’s reluctance to invoke the doctrine of waste is due, in part, to its
veneration of procedural aspects of board decisionmaking.187 This orientation is reflected in the
heavy reliance on the business judgment rule and asserted judicial incapacity to evaluate the
substantive fairness of corporate exchange. Judges may have a comparative competency to
evaluate the procedural integrity of corporate dealmaking. So even a massive payout to an
executive, substantively suspect, can be insulated from judicial review by procedural steps like
using independent outside consultants, giving directors briefing books about the background and
terms of the exchange, and getting approval of disinterested and fully informed directors and/or
shareholders. That is so despite deficiencies in the bargaining process boards and managers
sometimes use when establishing stock-based pay188 and well-known infirmities of shareholder
voting.189
B.

CONTRACTUAL UNCONSCIONABILITY

Contract law’s doctrine of unconscionability has much in common with corporate law’s
waste doctrine—but important differences too. Like corporate law’s waste doctrine, contract
law’s unconscionability doctrine is rarely used, especially concerning substantive terms of
exchange between commercial actors190 and routine transactions.191 This aversion rests on
freedom-of-contract principles and judicial resistance to paternalism, despite terms that are
unreasonable or impose hardship.192 Fairness is not necessarily the test, though there may be a
tempting case to conceive of courts policing contractual exchange using that term.193
Unconscionability signals absence of mutual assent on which contracts and contract law are
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based. That’s why the doctrine is scarcely used in arm’s-length transactions and more often in
cases involving fiduciaries and consumer transactions.194
As the following discussion shows, contract law’s propensity to use the unconscionability
doctrine to police exchanges intensifies according to a fairly coherent logic, which is quite
different than corporate law’s waste doctrine. The unconscionability doctrine is least likely to be
used in true arm’s-length transactions, even on lopsided terms. Examples are a grubstake
contract that pays off 200:1, even when made by one of uncertain mental competency,195 and an
emergency loan contract that pays off 80:1, even in a time of war and famine.196 Arm’s-length
contracts require essentially infinite disparity in the substantive terms of exchange to warrant
invoking unconscionability, as where the quantity in a goods contract is formulated to exceed the
world’s total supply of the good,197 or the price term increases exponentially according to an
essentially random function.198 It is not enough that one party’s profit on the transaction is equal
to the other party’s contractual payments.199 The strikingly lopsided terms are not inherently
objectionable but signal lack of mutual assent to a bargain.
It is more likely that courts in equity will invoke the unconscionability doctrine to address
obnoxious arrangements. Equity courts have refused specific performance of a land-sale contract
with a value ratio of 40:1, though money damages for its breach could still be available.200
Courts may refuse specific performance of commercial transactions in goods solely on the basis
of a spike in price between contract formation and performance, though allowing that other
remedies may be available.201 Those other remedies, including contract damages, may
nevertheless be reduced in light of the equitable impulse that denies equitable relief.202 Nor is
this reluctance limited to courts in equity, for courts also refuse to enforce bargains that shock
the conscience.203
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Policing is most common when a contract is between those in a confidential or fiduciary
relationship, such as brother–sister and business manager–client. In such settings, courts have
invoked constructive fraud to refuse enforcement of a land-sale contract with a value ratio of as
little as 15:1.204 Additionally, a court held a contract unconscionable where it was formed at the
urging of a trusted relation, such as an intimate partner, to exchange a contractual annuity right
for one-fourth its economic value (a 4:1 ratio).205 Unconscionability is also invoked to refuse
enforcement of a prenuptial contract on massively lopsided terms.206 All these cases involve such
obnoxious terms to warrant skepticism about whether an actual bargain was intended.
Contract law’s policing of unconscionable bargains is more frequent concerning
employee or consumer contracts. A standard example concerns the terms of retail insurance
contracts.207 Particular terms susceptible to challenge in employee and consumer contracts
concern matters like arbitration208 and other impositions against legal recourse.209 Even in
commercial contexts, judicial (and legislative) scrutiny is especially applied to terms limiting
contract remedies.210 The context of limitations on remedy is among the more likely in which
judges regard a term as unconscionable, and the Uniform Commercial Code supplies statutory
support for this stance.211
Over time, the classification of exchange types as arm’s-length or fiduciary in nature can
change, along with contract law’s propensity to intensify scrutiny for unconscionability. A good
modern example concerns franchise arrangements. These were once considered arm’s-length
transactions, so that even a unilateral termination right was unobjectionable so long as the
franchisor pointed it out and explained the clause to prevent unfair surprise.212 Gradually,
however, courts and legislatures grew increasingly attracted to treating these more nearly as
fiduciary in nature, policing lopsided termination and other clauses.213
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Two additional features of contract law’s unconscionability doctrine are important. First,
even a term not so repugnant as a substantive matter may be stricken for other reasons loosely
classified as procedural.214 This refers to the background leading to contract formation, including
the sophistication of the parties and how the term was presented and documented. For example,
boilerplate terms in dense fine print using legalistic language that few people understand are
suspect.215 The rationale for relief emphasizes limits on traditional assumptions of mutual assent
and freedom of contract that warrant sparing use of unconscionability doctrine.216 Second, when
any clause in a contract is unconscionable, the tendency is to strike the entire contract to
discourage overreaching.217 When this is not a risk, it is possible to sever obnoxious clauses and
enforce the rest of a contract.218
To synthesize this doctrine, unconscionability is available primarily when traditional
assumptions of contract law, mutual assent, and free bargaining cannot be relied on. Further,
unconscionability is most likely to be invoked when some fiduciary or confidential relationship
appears, equitable remedies are at stake, or the interests of certain groups, like franchisees,
consumers, or employees, are in need of protection.219 The doctrine is an outgrowth of more
fundamental judicial impulses to police unfairness, a formal expression of a tool not generally
found elsewhere in traditional contract law.220 It is not a stretch to think about adapting the
doctrine on behalf of shareholders making claims in equity that directors, who are fiduciaries,
authorize odious pay contracts without serious bargaining.
C.

RECONCILIATION

Comparison of corporate law’s waste doctrine and contract law’s unconscionability
doctrine shows several unsurprising affinities—and yet some surprising and striking differences.
Both are rarely invoked to upset an exchange transaction. Contract law’s sparing use is based on
the freedom-of-contract principle, along with doubt about judicial competence to evaluate the
substance of exchanges. Corporate law’s more sparing use is based on the principle of business
judgment, along with similar doubt. Both doctrines are rarely used in order to avoid an avalanche
of lawsuits seeking to rescind contracts and reverse corporation transactions.
Related doctrines in contract and corporate law use overlapping concepts. Both bodies of
law are averse to gifts, though for different reasons. Corporate law’s doctrine of waste prohibits
gifts of corporate assets when the absence of a bargain means the corporation received nothing in
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exchange.221 Contract law’s basic principle of consideration marks off as unenforceable promises
to make gifts that lack the indicia of a bargain seen as central to enforceable exchange
transactions.222 A sharp contrast appears concerning completed gifts, however, which the
common law of contracts and property recognizes as irrevocable and yet corporate law would
rescind. 223
Neither body of law requires equivalence of the bargaining terms. In contract law, this is
the peppercorn theory of consideration, and works to the extent that even nominal consideration
performs functions required to separate exchanges from gifts.224 In both contract and corporate
law, the issue is whether there is any consideration and, in corporate law, on occasion at least
some relation between what the corporation transferred and what it received.225 Both bodies of
law place a premium on the procedural side of transactions. In contract law, the
unconscionability doctrine is customarily distinguished between substantive and procedural
aspects.226 Procedural unconscionability addresses how a transaction originated, the way it was
documented, how terms were presented and other aspects of bargaining and documenting the
exchange. In corporate law, judges place great weight on the process a corporation follows to
approve a transaction.227
Above all, both bodies of law establish limits posing similar questions using similar
syntax. In contract law, an exchange or term may be found unconscionable only if no fairminded person would propose it and no rational person would assent to it.228 In corporate law, a
transaction may be upset only if the consideration received is so inadequate in value that no
person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation paid.229
Both look to the relationship between economic and business risk on both sides of the
exchange.230
Despite affinities, differences appear in these contract and corporate law doctrines.
Contract law is premised on freedom of exchange and encourages parties to act in their own self-
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interest so long as the parties are competent and have legal capacity;231 corporate law is primarily
fiduciary-based and premised on imposing duties on corporate managers to elevate corporate and
shareholder interests above personal interests.232 Contract law’s roots are in law courts, and
standard remedies are money damages, not equitable relief; corporate law’s roots are in equity
courts, which Delaware courts expressly retain, and standard remedies include equitable relief.233
Given these two fundamental distinctions—corporate law as fiduciary and equitable, and
contract law as arm’s-length and legal—one could expect the otherwise roughly equivalent
policing doctrines to be more frequently or robustly used in corporate law than in contract law.
Casebooks, cases, and scholarship suggest exactly the opposite. Indeed, contract law
tends to resort to the unconscionability doctrine only when no other grounds exist to provide
traditional doctrinal excuse, such as lack of capacity or competency, nondisclosure,
misrepresentation, duress, or fraud.234 In striking contrast, a corporate law claim of waste is so
difficult to sustain that there usually must be some other grounds for challenging a transaction,
such as breach of fiduciary duty,235 fraud,236 or ultra vires (corporate law’s functional equivalent
to lack of capacity or competency).237 These all can be tough to show, sometimes requiring such
extremes as absorbing the corporation’s entire earnings, preventing shareholder distributions, or
risking insolvency.238 One explanation is the lesser-perceived need for judicial superintendence
and protection of shareholders compared to consumers, employees, franchisees, and other
vulnerable types.239 But many shareholders are as vulnerable as those other types. A majority of
American households increasingly rely on stock ownership as a savings vehicle, directly or
through intermediaries.240
Yet since the 1930s, corporate law has insulated executive pay contracts from judicial
review for scrutiny by using the anemic waste standard. Scores of articles suggest how corporate
law could be strengthened to provide requisite policing, but the suggestions have not been
adopted. The population number of successfully contested stock-based pay cases under corporate
law is miniscule. No appellate court has ever affirmed an order against a public corporationto
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reduce its managerial compensation under a waste theory. In less than one-third of Delaware
corporate law cases asserting waste in the executive pay context have shareholders prevailed at
even the preliminary stages, such as motions to dismiss or for summary judgment (though the
rate for non-Delaware cases is closer to half). If pay contracts are to remain an important part of
U.S. corporate life, it is necessary to find other routes to judicially scrutinize them, and
contractual unconscionability is promising.
IV. CONTRACT LAW SCRUTINY
Stock-based pay arrangements are made pursuant to corporation–manager contracts.
They are contracts like any other and should be rescinded when unconscionable—whether or not
they amount to waste under corporate law. That a board approved the contract should not be
dispositive—nor should a shareholder vote.241 Several hurdles must be navigated to enable this
treatment. The hurdles mean that few cases would succeed through the gauntlet, catching only
the most odious pay contracts and not touching legitimate ones or other categories of corporate
contracts (like merger agreements, loan agreements, leases, and the like).
To encapsulate the proposal and its appeal, consider a thumbnail sketch comparing how
corporate law works with how contract law would work. Under corporate law, disputes involving
a corporation’s internal affairs are governed by its state of incorporation, most often Delaware
for public corporations, according to that state’s principle of conflicts-of-laws. Under corporate
law, compensation decisions are protected by the business judgment rule. Even if shareholders
assert board breach of duty of loyalty, that does not mean judges scrutinize pay contracts for
fairness. Contracts are reviewed under the doctrine of waste, which few board decisions fail.
Courts often cite any shareholder approval of related stock-pay plans to support deference to
board decisions, though acknowledging limits in disclosure and voting. Shareholder challenges
are usually treated as derivative, meaning to proceed the shareholder first must demand that the
board redress the claim or show that to be futile, requiring proof that the pay or procedure
leading to it were unprotected by the business judgment rule. Shareholders rarely win, even when
challenging extravagant payouts.
In contrast, a contract-law claim of unconscionability would begin by asserting that
today’s pay contracts are not inevitably matters of internal affairs governed by the company’s
state of incorporation, but by law determined under other conflicts-of-law principles. First, that
would mean that contract law applies, not corporate law. Second, which state’s contract law
applies would be determined according to which state has the greatest interest, influenced by
where the contract was formed and performed, with contractual choice-of-law clauses being
relevant, but not dispositive. Under contract law, no special deference is due to boards
authorizing corporations to enter into unconscionable contracts. A shareholder allegation that a
stock-based pay contract is unconscionable, ultra vires, and thus should be rescinded is the kind
of claim that even corporate law may treat as direct rather than derivative. If such claims are
treated as derivative, they should at least support excusing demand as futile. Accordingly,
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obstacles to shareholder litigation are reduced and shareholders more often proceed to the merits
of the unconscionability determination.
The following provides a detailed evaluation. Part IV.A evaluates the hurdles and how
surmounting them serves a screening function. Part IV.B illustrates how the contract-law
approach would work in comparison to the corporate-law approach.
A.

HURDLES AND SCREENS

To enable shareholders to test executive compensation contracts using contract law raises
challenges of the internal-affairs doctrine, contractual choice-of-law clauses, the classification of
litigation as direct or derivative (which includes how to apply the ultra vires doctrine), and issues
of judicial comity and competence.

1.

Internal Affairs

The first issue is whether pay contracts are matters of a corporation’s internal affairs so
that its state of incorporation controls without regard to any other factor, or whether they are like
other contracts governed according to broader conflict-of-law principles. The internal-affairs
doctrine is deeply embedded,242 though claims that it is founded in constitutional-law principles
are contested.243 Its rationale rests on how the incorporating state has an interest in relationships
among the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders. Those participants have a
recognizable and protectable expectancy in knowing what laws apply to them in their relations
with other participants. Subjecting them to inconsistent laws, especially multiple state laws, as
opposed to a single federal law, should be minimized. Those interests are strong concerning
governance matters like shareholder voting rights, board elections, corporate dividend policy,
and transfers or protection of corporate control.244
Other states may have an interest in those matters too, though they are seen to be weaker.
States with an interest in a corporate contract include those states where the corporation has a
large presence, measured by property ownership (including headquarters), sales, employees,
shareholders, lenders, or other metrics.245 For internal affairs, however, even such interests do
not necessarily justify altering the usual choice-of-law rule. As a result, state statutory efforts to
reach out and regulate the internal affairs of corporations incorporated elsewhere but having
some contacts with the local state are rebuffed.246 Even so, not all states embrace the internal242
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affairs doctrine with equal enthusiasm,247 and scholarly critiques based on fundamental
principles of republican democracy test the doctrine’s legitimacy. 248 Delaware courts seem to
overstate the constitutional pedigree of the internal-affairs doctrine, largely in a political bid to
retain its dominant position in U.S. corporate-law production, rather than on traditional legal
argumentation.249
Still, there is a class of contracts that do not fit within the internal-affairs doctrine and in
which states other than the state of incorporation have a strong, or stronger, interest.250
Corporations enter into numerous contracts with third parties that are clearly external matters.
Contracts between corporations and auditors,251 lenders, landlords, suppliers, and labor unions
are all external, rather than internal, affairs. Citizens of the state of contract formation and
performance—and any breach with resulting legal enforcement—have a clear interest in these.
The terms of those relationships, contractual and otherwise, need not be governed under the
internal-affairs doctrine’s choice of domestic law, but either by contractual choice of law or
general tests of interests under conflicts-of-law principles.
Where do pay contracts between the corporation and officers fall? In one sense, they are
internal affairs. They are internal affairs because the contract is authorized by the board on behalf
of the corporation and its shareholders with corporate officers as the counterparty. The
arrangement regulates the relationship of the corporation to the officer. It contemplates making
the manager into a shareholder. The case for seeing the contract as such an internal affair is
strong, especially if the recipient is also a director, chairman, or CEO.252 It is strengthened by
standard academic talk that conceives of the stock-based pay device as a way to align manager
incentives with shareholder interests.253 That is a way to reduce agency costs, quintessential
matters of the internal affairs of the corporation.
It is at least equally valid to classify manager-pay contracts as external affairs. The
simplest case for that view occurs when a corporation enters into a contract with someone who
247
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was not previously a director, officer, or shareholder of the corporation. The contract is simply
an employment agreement with an outsider. In that view, it is akin to other contracts, including
labor union contracts, nonmanagerial employment agreements, and loan agreements. 254 That
viewpoint does not change radically when an existing manager is the counterparty.255 It remains
even if that person is already a shareholder. The contract is about compensation, the cost of an
external resource imported into the enterprise, not about power among internal participants, like
shareholder voting rights and related procedures for corporate decision making.
Consider an extreme case of a contract that no state would recognize as enforceable—an
illegal bargain of any sort. It could be a contract for illegal gambling, narcotics trafficking,
pollution, prostitution, employment discrimination, or the like. Suppose a Delaware corporation
is operating casinos and garbage removal from New Jersey. Its board approves and shareholders
ratify an employment contract with the casino manager and sanitation manager. Both provide for
corporate payment of bonus compensation triggered by the manager violating state law, say the
casino manager staging dog fights or catering to minors and the refuse manager dumping excess
waste in environmentally protected areas.
Are those contracts to be seen as internal affairs and governed by Delaware corporate
law, or can New Jersey contract law apply? Perhaps no one could say that the contracts violate
Delaware corporate law. The board approved and shareholders ratified them following statutory
procedures and consistent with standards of fiduciary duty in that state. But does that make them
enforceable as a matter of contract law? They violate state law in New Jersey. Just because a
board approves and shareholders ratify such a contract, or a stock-based pay contract violating
unconscionability doctrine, does not make it an internal affair; it is a contract just like all others
and susceptible to evaluation by courts in states where the contract is formed or to be
performed.256
For a more closely analogous case, suppose a corporation–manager contract contains a
covenant not to compete, barring the manager from post-severance employment for five years for
firms in the same industry and geographic region. Is that contract’s enforceability merely a
question for the state where a corporation filed its charter, or is it instead also subject to the
contract law of the state of its formation or performance? Is that a question of the internal affairs
of the corporation’s home state or the contract’s ―home state?‖ There is good authority that the
state contract law of the place of formation or performance governs, not the contract law of the
state of incorporation.257
254
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Few cases directly address whether a stock-based pay contract is within the internalaffairs doctrine or governed by the contract law of another state. In an unusual setting,
shareholders of a Delaware corporation challenged a stock-option plan, approved by the board
and ratified by shareholder vote.258 The Delaware Chancery Court, under precedents that now
seem discarded, agreed with the shareholder that the plan was a mere gift in violation of
Delaware corporate law.259 In doing so, the court rejected the proponents’ argument that New
York contract law governed and supported enforcing it as an option contract, which a New York
statute declared in certain cases would be enforceable even absent consideration.260
The chancery court disagreed that New York contract law applied under the internalaffairs doctrine (it also disagreed that the New York statute supported the proponents’ position
even if it were governing law). The court’s justifications were: stock options are not ordinary
transactions, but matters of corporate structure; the plaintiff’s stock certificate was issued in
compliance with Delaware law; the certificate created rights under Delaware law; the stock
options were approved by the board and shareholders; and the resulting controversy involved the
internal affairs.261 The Delaware Supreme Court, though reversing the chancery court’s view that
the plan amounted to a gift in violation of Delaware corporate law, agreed that Delaware
corporate law governed, not New York contract law.262 It was impatient with the proponents’
choice-of-law argument, dismissing it in a paragraph, referring to the chancery court opinion,
and saying it needed no further discussion.
The chancery court opinion, after reciting the foregoing five arguments, then relied
heavily on a famous United States Supreme Court case, Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.263 It held
that the internal-affairs doctrine governed matters of state corporate law about the processes a
board and shareholders followed in approving a corporate action.264 It was an odd citation—there
was no question throughout the protracted Rogers litigation that the law of the state of
incorporation governed. The wrangling was entirely about whether a federal district court sitting
in a different state should decline jurisdiction given the uncertain state of the incorporating
state’s laws.265 Neither the Supreme Court nor any of the other courts, nor even the plaintiffs in
the case, ever asserted that any law other than the incorporating state should apply.
Both these cases and all the opinions addressed stock-option plans, broad corporate
programs applicable to hundreds of employees. Shareholders objected to corporate procedures,
258
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share dilution, disclosure, and whether all that corporate machinery comported with the corporate
statutes of the state of incorporation. There were no claims involving the common law of
contracts. Given that disputation, it was difficult not to see the cases as entirely about internal
affairs. Even the assertion of the one case’s plan proponents that New York contract law
governed and supported the arrangement was far-fetched given how deeply into internal
corporate procedures the case had plunged.
An important implication of the Rogers case, however, concerns jurisdiction. Some
courts that identify an issue as governed by the internal affairs doctrine, and thus another state’s
corporate law, take that to bar jurisdiction.266 Others recognize that the internal-affairs doctrine is
a choice-of-law principle and does not bar jurisdiction, enabling them to hear a case though
applying another state’s corporate law.267 In the middle, courts recognize the internal-affairs
doctrine as an issue, but neither a bar to jurisdiction nor a bar to applying that state’s own
noncorporate law. This stance is justified when the court’s exercise of jurisdiction and
adjudication would not ―inextricably involve‖ it in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. 268
A helpful example appears in an employee’s breach-of-contract claim, which included stockbased pay, against a Delaware corporation in a Pennsylvania court. 269 The Delaware corporation
sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the internal-affairs doctrine, but the court rejected
the argument and heard the case.
2.

Choice of Law; Choice of Forum

If managers both control the contracting process and know there is risk that their pay
contracts may be declared unconscionable by some states, they will select the laws of the
jurisdiction most favorable to managers—those with the weakest contractual unconscionability
laws. If so, that could make the contract approach to executive-pay contracts a dead end, no more
capable than corporate law of policing obnoxious pay arrangements.
On the other hand, a choice-of-law clause is not dispositive on conflict-of-law questions.
True, many courts defer to contractual choice-of-law clauses, even when that means overriding a
law or regulation of that state.270 But other relevant factors include where the contract was
formed and where the corporation or manager are located. An important issue is which
contending state has the greatest interest in a contract’s enforceability.271 Relevant are factors
that appear in state quasi-domestic corporation laws, like where sizable portions of a
corporation’s assets are located, revenues generated, payroll made, or shareholders reside.272
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Furthermore, an assertion of unconscionability could render the entire contract
unenforceable, including any choice-of-law clause.273 Imagine an employment contract with
stock-based payments containing both an otherwise enforceable choice-of-law clause and
obnoxious clauses alleged to be unconscionable. Suppose the stock-based pay contract contains
both a choice-of-law clause and an obnoxious payout clause. And suppose holders file a case in
state court where the corporation is headquartered or has other requisite contacts to give that
court jurisdiction. Reviewing courts may apply the chosen law in deciding whether the contract
is unconscionable, except when that would produce a result inconsistent with the public policy of
the reviewing court’s state.274 If found to be unconscionable, the court is authorized to declare
that and grant rescission.275
Even a Delaware choice-of-law clause would mean Delaware contract law, rather than
corporate law, would apply, potentially changing the analysis and outcome. Two principal
Delaware Supreme Court cases state the contract standard, one addressing franchise
termination276 and the other dealing with an insurance-contract arbitration clause.277 These cases
adopted familiar tests from other jurisdictions, stating that unconscionability requires showing
―absence of meaningful choice and contract terms unreasonably favorable to one of the
parties.‖278 They ask whether a contract is ―such as no [person] in his [or her] senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair [person] would accept, on
the other.‖279
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The test also considers the ―business practices of the community‖ to test ―whether the
terms are so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices
of the time and place.‖280 Though both cases upheld the contract at issue, and numerous lower
Delaware court opinions have followed suit,281 other Delaware cases have found contracts to be
unconscionable, constituting an inventory that appears greater than cases finding corporate
waste. Examples appear in a famous real-estate transfer setting,282 in overpayments based on
erroneous corporate valuation calculations,283 and in attempts to limit liability in commercial
transactions.284
Finally, as the Delaware Supreme Court cases indicate, Delaware has no peculiar
comparative advantage or special skill in contract law the way it has in corporate law. Its own
body of contract law draws more heavily on broader common-law principles from other
jurisdictions than its corporate law does.285 Just as many other states look to Delaware corporate
law when developing their corporate law, Delaware contract law looks to the law in states with
better developed contract law. The distinction of particularly well-developed state contract law
likely would go to states like California, Massachusetts, or New York. The body of contractunconscionability law is certainly more robust in those states than Delaware’s corporate law of
waste.286 Accordingly, at least at the margin, even Delaware contract law could incrementally
expand the population of pay contracts found unconscionable compared to those found to violate
its corporate law of waste.
Aside from choice of law, a corporate contract could also contain a forum-selection
clause, naming as the sole forum for litigation a management-friendly state, such as Delaware.287
In fact, dozens of Delaware companies during 2010 adopted by-law amendments purporting to
name Delaware as the sole forum to resolve intra-corporate disputes.288 This wave was prompted
by a Delaware Chancery Court opinion suggesting that Delaware corporations adopt Delaware
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forum clauses in their charters.289 This gambit is limited to intra-corporate affairs, however,
usually expressly describing claims for breach of duty, statutory violations, and other matters
within the internal-affairs doctrine.290 Accordingly, they would not apply to corporate pay
contracts seen as external affairs. In any event, the enforceability of such clauses—whether
appearing in by-laws, charters or contracts—depends generally on analysis analogous to that just
discussed concerning choice-of-law clauses.
3.

Direct Ultra Vires Suits and Derivative Demands

Under unavoidable corporate-law rules, shareholder challenges to pay contracts as
unconscionable would have to be classified as ―derivative‖ or ―direct.‖ If derivative, the claim is
brought on behalf of the corporation as a whole. Shareholders would face the hurdles all such
suits pose under corporate law that grants considerable power and deference to the board. 291 The
issue of whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative is about the corporation’s internal
affairs and therefore governed by the home state’s corporate law.292
Many corporate-law statutes, including Delaware’s, state expressly that claims alleging
that an action was beyond a corporation’s power may be asserted in a direct action.293 They
authorize that recovery of any compensation in such cases is made to the corporation, though the
form of the case is direct, not derivative. This is the strongest ground to justify classifying
challenges to pay contracts as unconscionable as direct claims, avoiding the hurdles derivative
litigation poses.294 Even for states with such statutes, however, a preliminary question is whether
a shareholder can allege that an unconscionable employment agreement is ultra vires—beyond
the corporation’s power. Modern corporations are empowered to engage in any lawful activity,
but are not empowered to engage in any unlawful activity.295
Corporations have no power to enter into bargains that are unlawful because they violate
positive law expressed in statutes or judicial doctrines.296 Contracts are illegal when they violate
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anti-bribery, antitrust, environmental statutes, or common-law rules prohibiting unlawful
restraints of trade.297 Such illegal activities are ultra vires. (Further examples of illegal bargains
that people lack legal capacity to form and are more likely to involve individuals than businesses,
are those for arson, murder, prostitution, narcotics trafficking, and tax evasion.) Toward the
opposite, but equally easy, extreme are bargains that are merely unenforceable because they lack
requisites of valid contracts, such as consideration or mutual assent. But such defects do not
make them illegal.
Unconscionable bargains can fall into either of those extremes or in between, depending
on the exact reasons why they shock the conscience of a court. Some are both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable while others are either one or the other but not both. Those that
suffer from both infirmities more likely warrant being called illegal than those suffering from
only one that may be declared merely unenforceable. Some fail because the terms of exchange
demonstrate that assent was defective, and thus they seem more akin to merely unenforceable,
but not illegal, bargains. An overly broad covenant not to compete may be an example. Others
fail because they are repugnant on grounds of public policy, though not expressly outlawed.298 A
contract providing for a bonus to an employee for staging dog fights is illustrative. Executivepay contracts challenged as unconscionable would not automatically fit into either category, but
those plagued by both procedural and substantive unconscionability and violating public policy
would be classified as ultra vires.
But not all states have statutes authorizing direct actions for ultra vires claims, and
though ultra vires claims are often treated as direct, they are not always treated that way. 299
Those points require a more complete evaluation of the line between direct and derivative suits,
which is not always clear.300 The ultimate issue is whether an alleged harm to be remedied is
better conceived as individual to a shareholder or to the corporation as a whole.301 If the
corporation suffers the alleged harm and the corporate interest is remedied by a favorable
judgment, the corporation is the real party in interest. But that conception is loaded with inherent
difficulty, reflected in how corporation law provides that directors owe duties to their
corporations and its shareholders.302 Thus, breaches of duty, a fundamental element of corporate
law, may result in harm to the corporation, the shareholders, or both. The result of that inherent
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conceptual difficulty is that factors inform the analysis and classification decision, not scientific
algorithms or natural-law truths.303
A common approach to classifying claims as direct or derivative recognizes that there are
some clear examples at the extremes. Claims for breach of duty often are derivative, and those
for denying shareholders’ particular rights (like inspection, voting, or preemptive rights) are
invariably direct.304 Similarly polar, a claim that a contract should be enforced is usually
derivative, as are most claims seeking money damages, whereas a claim that corporate action
was beyond the corporation’s power (the ultra vires claim) is usually seen as direct305 (as are
most claims seeking injunctive or other prospective relief306). Likewise, claims seeking
cancellation of a stock-issuance plan are seen as direct if grounded on a theory of improper
purpose but derivative when grounded on a theory of inadequate consideration.307
As these examples suggest, when classifying elusive cases, two factors are particularly
useful: the theory of liability and the remedy sought. In challenging a stock-based pay contract,
shareholders are more likely to succeed in classifying the case as direct if they assert that its
unconscionable character puts it beyond the corporation’s authority to execute it and the primary
remedy sought is rescission.308 The liability theory of unconscionability aligns the case with
those asserting ultra vires claims more often, though not always, seen as direct and not
derivative.309 The remedial theory of rescission aligns the case with those seeking equitable
relief, likewise more often, though not always, seen as direct not derivative.310 If the claim
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included an assertion of restitution for value transferred, the statutes authorizing direct actions
for ultra vires support awarding that amount to the corporation, without disturbing the directaction classification.311
It is not essential to classify the case as direct for the non-Delaware contract law
approach to work. Even when an ultra vires claim is for some reason classified as derivative, it
often has the minimum effect of justifying the excusing of shareholder demand on the board as
futile.312 That surmounts an important hurdle shareholders face in getting a decision on the
merits in derivative litigation.313 Demand can be excused for other reasons, too, and a challenge
to an executive-pay contract heard on the merits.
Additional hurdles may appear, however. Corporation law allows independent board
members to take control of the litigation and announce it is in the corporation’s interest to
dismiss the case.314 Courts are inclined to allow this, applying corporate law that venerates board
independence and is averse to second-guessing even the most extravagant board decisions. But a
shareholder advancing to that stage of litigation armed with an assertion of contractual
unconscionability has a new arrow in her quiver. Stronger than the anemic doctrine of corporate
waste, this new arrow could tip the balance to shareholder victory in an appropriate case.315
4.

Comity and Judicial Competence

Despite credible grounds for displacing the internal-affairs doctrine and lowering the
hurdles to shareholder litigation, courts may understandably hesitate to venture into this territory.
Legal uncertainties may appear concerning the internal affairs doctrine versus other conflict-oflaw principles, and it may be challenging to faithfully apply another state’s corporation law to
classify the case as direct or derivative. Even the most conscientious judges may find these
difficulties too daunting and invoke comity to dismiss a case.316
Judges may be even more cautious about their competency on the merits of a claim, given
contract complexity.317 Limited judicial competence is a common rationale for corporate law’s
business judgment rule, for judicial reticence to invoke corporate law’s waste doctrine, and for
the rarity of judicial declarations finding contractual unconscionability. Concern about judicial
311

Many cases challenging pay contracts are treated as derivative, but that is because they assert claims such as
waste, breach of duty, or dilution. See Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036–39 (discussing cases). A shareholder would not
make such assertions challenging a stock-based pay contract as unconscionable and seeking its rescission.
312
In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007) (clarifying that an assertion of ultra vires
does not automatically excuse demand as futile); Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ. A. 19191, 2002 WL
31888343 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002); Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1186 (Nev. 2006).
313
Other hurdles remain, like standing and bond-posting requirements, but these are less formidable. See supra note
23.
314
E.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
315
Review of the formidable hurdles of derivative litigation may simply show the limitations of the value of the
contemporary derivative suit, at least in Delaware, and provide a basis for endorsing some of the various proposals
to reform it. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 133–36, 147–53 (2008).
316
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns,
Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713 (2009).
317
Determinations of contractual unconscionability are questions of law for judges to decide, not juries. E.g.,
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Mass. 1980).

48

competence may strengthen in proportion to the complexity of a corporate contract. Many
opinions showing cautiousness in policing stock-based pay state this competence modestly.318
Even when using sophisticated experts to referee a dispute, courts say it is thorny to estimate the
value of pay that stock-based devices yield and harder yet to estimate the value a recipient
contributes in exchange.319
The solution appears in the strict tests judges apply under both corporate law and contract
law. The doctrine of corporate waste eases the challenge by invoking the doctrine only in cases
so extreme that everyone can see the payment was merely a gift; contractual unconscionability
ameliorates the difficulty by limiting its use to cases in which everyone can see a contract or
term is obnoxious. Evaluation under either doctrine does not require judicial review using
advanced financial calculus. Judges will not find this more daunting than many other problems
they face every day. (And remember the question of contract unconscionability is a question of
law for judges,320 not for juries, so there is no risk of runaway juries upsetting legitimate
corporate pay contracts.)
As in corporate law and contract law generally, judicial competence is probably stronger
concerning procedural aspects. Evaluation of contract formation would not be confined to
corporate law’s narrow focus on nominal or formal director independence or information. It
would consider the bargaining process. Professors Bebchuk and Fried show how the formal
process sometimes lacks bargaining.321 The process can be meaningless, even though it may give
the appearance of legitimacy by formal board independence supported by documentation
supplied by consultants. And those procedures may be no more reliable when undertaken in
compliance with Dodd–Frank Act requirements concerning director and consultant
independence.322 Nor would shareholder voting required by that Act be dispositive, though
shareholder votes against pay proposals that a board simply ignores would support an inference
of procedural unconscionability.323 Shareholders, acting through their board agents, may purport
to be bound by contracts that are worse than take-it-or-leave it contracts of adhesion. Absence of
bargaining would support characterizing the resulting stock-based pay contract as afflicted by
procedural unconscionability.
Analysis of substantive unconscionability would be more complex. It would also be
contextual, so stating broad principles is difficult. But two tests may be suggested. One would
compare the substantive terms of the option pay contract with model terms such as those offered
by academics in the new reform agenda reviewed previously.324 Those prescriptions endorse the
validity of an option pay contract containing long-term alienation restraints, limitations on
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managerial discretion in determining grant and exercise dates and procedures, and prohibiting
hedging instruments to circumvent the plan. Contract terms containing such features should be
viewed favorably. These models rebuke pay contracts with stock options that vest and become
exercisable within brief time periods, allowing managerial determination of grant and exercise
dates and procedures, and permitting managerial use of circumvention devices. Contract terms
containing these features should be viewed skeptically. A primary issue would be whether the
terms are reasonably designed to induce retention or transfer corporate value with little received
in exchange.325
Another approach, though more intricate, would compare dollar amounts, relating the
value of stock-based pay to the value contribution managers make in exchange. This would
resemble the proportionality test Delaware courts once applied to test pay contracts for corporate
waste.326 For some arrangements, either part may be difficult or impossible to measure with
reasonable certainty.327 In such cases, it would be imprudent to declare the contract
unconscionable, and modesty regarding judicial competency provides reasonable grounds for
restraint. In some cases, however, it may be relatively easy to identify or estimate the amounts
with reasonable certainty. In the vast majority of those cases, the ratio, even if substantial, would
pass judicial scrutiny, given that the doctrine of contractual unconscionability still gives
substantial deference to freedom-of-contract principles and recognizes limited judicial
competence. But in the few cases where that ratio can be measured with reasonable certainty and
does shock the judicial conscience, the contract should be declared unconscionable and
rescinded.
Even so, these points about judicial competence present another hurdle to shareholders—
and another reason skeptics should not oppose this proposal in principle. The hurdles
shareholders face to obtain independent judicial review are formidable, so there is scant risk of
any floodgate effect in promoting the doctrine of contractual unconscionability as a way to police
pay contracts.328 It offers an incremental increase in the population of disputes susceptible to
judicial rebuke for overreaching. One or a few cases entertaining the claim or declaring a stockbased pay contract unconscionable would yield the desired effect of providing a legal check
against corporate boards being excessively solicitous of senior managers.
B.

APPLICATIONS

The following illustrates some applications of this theory. As mentioned in the
Introduction, it begins with a detailed comparison of The Walt Disney Company case followed
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by a brief illustration concerning the New York Stock Exchange case, along with notes on a
pending Citigroup case.
1.

The Walt Disney Company

The Walt Disney Company is a Delaware corporation headquartered in California. Its
board entered into an employment contract, which included stock-based payments, with an
outsider it recruited into a senior executive position. Negotiation, execution, performance, and
termination of the contract all took place in California (and incidentally in some other states
during travel and remote negotiations, though never Delaware). The contract stated that it was to
be governed by California law.329 The contract provided for a lucrative payout, consisting
dominantly of very short-term stock options, if the company fired the executive without cause.
Fourteen months later, the company did fire the executive without cause, triggering a payout to
him of nearly $140 million in cash and stock. The massive payout in relation to the modest work
drew intense criticism throughout the United States.
Shareholders sued under Delaware corporate law and eventually lost. The proceedings
were extensive and resulted in a series of shifting Delaware corporate law judicial opinions. The
first trial-court opinion dismissed the complaint.330 Notably, the court said the contract was just
like a board decision to authorize a loan and/or to borrow money. 331 That analogy is interesting
in the context of this Article since it supports the view expressed here that pay contracts do not
implicate the internal-affairs doctrine, but may be governed by the law of a state other than the
state of incorporation. Despite that recognition, neither that opinion nor any other in the litigation
gave any further consideration to contract law issues but examined the entire case through the
lens of Delaware corporate law.
The first appellate opinion reversed this dismissal of the complaint and allowed leave to
amend.332 The court said this is a ―troubling case on the merits‖; the board and its processes were
―casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory‖; the contract gave an ―exceedingly lucrative, if not
luxurious‖ payout compared to the executive’s value to the company; and the ―sheer size‖ of the
payout ―pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment‖ of the board. 333 Even
so, while this justified reversing dismissal and allowing leave to amend the complaint, the court
denied that all this satisfied derivative litigation’s demand requirement or excused it as futile.
Thus, although they have no corporate law significance, those harsh judicial excoriations could
have been nearly decisive of a claim for contractual unconscionability.
The second trial-court opinion held that demand was excused because the shareholders
raised sufficient doubt that the pay and procedure were protected by the business judgment
rule.334 The allegations did not merely suggest directors were being grossly negligent and failing
329
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to become informed—all of which the court signaled might not justify excusing demand—
instead, the allegations suggested directors had ―consciously and intentionally disregarded‖ their
duties.335 Still, all this meant was that demand was excused as a matter of corporate law. Again,
under contract law, those assertions would strongly support a determination of absence of arm’slength bargaining amounting to a defect in contract formation and justifying, along with the
exorbitant payout, a finding that the contract was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
The third trial-court opinion, reaching the corporate law merits after hearing the case,
resolved the issues differently.336 The directors fell short of best practices, but that did not violate
Delaware corporate-law duties, which are far weaker. They did not act in bad faith and were not
grossly negligent.337 Nor did they commit waste, despite the ―breathtaking amounts of severance
pay.‖338 Waste is ―rarely found in Delaware courts‖ because it puts an ―onerous burden‖ on the
one asserting it.339 The court added: ―waste is a rare, unconscionable case[] where directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.‖340 The quoted reference to
unconscionability is curious, incorrectly suggesting equivalence between corporate law’s
doctrine of waste and contract law’s doctrine of unconscionability.
The final appellate opinion affirmed this outcome, saying the board did not breach any
Delaware corporate-law duty, though repeating that directors did not live up to best practices.341
No waste occurred under Delaware corporate law because there was a ―rational business
purpose‖ to the deal, one of inducing the executive to leave other employment to work for
Disney, and there could be no waste when merely paying amounts pursuant to a contract.342
There was no inquiry about whether the contract was valid as a matter of contract law. The
lawyers and the judges all focused solely on questions of corporate law.
It is not difficult to imagine that a California court applying contract law may respond
differently. To begin to see this, consider how the case would have been handled if the executive
were suing Disney. He would not have filed a corporate law case in Delaware under Delaware
corporation law. He would have filed a breach-of-contract case, probably in California, under
state contract law. If the board wished, it could possibly have defended against such an action by
invoking contractual unconscionability. There would have been essentially no remote reason to
think that the issue was a matter of the internal affairs of the corporation so that Delaware law
governed.343 It would have done the board essentially no good to defend the case by saying that
performing the contract would amount to waste under Delaware corporate law. But there would
have been a strong case that it was unconscionable under California contract law.344
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Now suppose, as this Article suggests, shareholders had not sued the board and the
executive under Delaware corporate law. Suppose instead they sued in a California court under
state contract law asserting the contract was unconscionable, seeking rescission (and, to the
extent any payments had been made, restitution and, to the extent they had not, an injunction).345
The applicable law is California contract law because the contract was formed, performed, and
terminated there between California citizens, one human and one corporate. The internal-affairs
doctrine does not change that and the choice of California law.346
As to whether the claim is direct or derivative, the remedy of rescission strongly supports
classifying the case as direct and could be accompanied by an injunction against any payouts
under the contract. The only real issue is, to the extent payments had been made, whether
recovering the payments in restitution should change the characterization. The statutes
authorizing direct actions for ultra vires conduct support retaining that characterization even
when the resulting award of compensation is paid to the corporation.347 The theory of liability
supports treating it as direct, at least insofar as shareholders assert that the contract is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, if not because the public-policy stakes are acute.
If the case were classified as derivative, demand would readily be excused in any event for the
reasons the Delaware courts gave when they excused demand.
On the merits, there are deep defects in the process, not amounting to an arm’s-length
bargain between the board and officer. With those shareholder agents shortchanging the process,
the case for procedural unconscionability is strong. The substantive inquiry focuses on the deal at
the time the contract was formed. At that time, a fair-minded and rational person might have
agreed to pay a top executive like this millions of dollars for performance. If the person
performed badly and turned out to be worth far less, that would be chalked up to an unwise or
improvident bargain, as many bargains in fact turn out and that contract law does not disturb. But
the clause at issue here did not involve high payments for uncertain performance. It involved
high payments upon being fired. The contract, when written, contained this exploding payment
due precisely when the company had determined that performance was subpar.
What the company claimed it received for dangling that lucre was attracting the executive
to the company in the first place. The company had to induce the executive to join Disney
instead of pursuing other opportunities. As the Delaware courts suggested, it is difficult to
measure what inducements would be reasonable.348 That is a function of the executive’s
opportunity costs and the company’s alternatives. But that is readily and more rationally handled
by payments targeted to that initial attraction, like a signing bonus, a high annual pay rate, a high
annual bonus amount or percentage, or something of the sort. To agree up front on a payment
drafted and interpreted to invite alternative performances, rather than stipulated damages, and be validated on that
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that would clearly reach into the tens of millions of dollars and could easily be payable within
short order defies rationality and fairness. Combined, the board’s inexcusable process and the
questionable initial commitment to pay someone upon being fired makes a credible case for a
court applying traditional contract law to rescind it as unconscionable.349
2.
The New York Stock Exchange
The corporate law case concerning the $140-million payday of the ousted CEO of the
New York Stock Exchange (―NYSE‖), Richard Grasso,350 may have turned out the other way
too, had the court applied contract law. In the years right before the NYSE became a public
corporation, it was a nonprofit New York corporation governed by that state’s corporate law
governing nonprofits. Serving the NYSE as Board Chair and CEO was Richard A. Grasso from
1995 until he resigned in controversy in 2003. Grasso served under a series of contracts made in
1995, 1999, and 2003. From 1995 to2002, the NYSE paid Grasso a base of just over $1 million,
plus annual bonuses that were less than $1 million in 1995 but exceeded $10 million in 2002.
Though generous by ordinary worker standards, these payouts were modest by corporate CEO
standards.
That changed in 2003 when Grasso’s contract called for a lump-sum payment of $140
million on the spot plus another $50 million payable over the next four years. He procured this
contract over strenuous objections of many NYSE board members. Grasso used a suspect
approval procedure. The board members approved the contract at a board meeting whose agenda
did not list the subject. Many board members who opposed it were therefore absent from the
meeting. Those voting for approval did not represent a majority of the board. Board members
opposed to the contract promptly objected to the exorbitant payout blessed using this irregular
practice.
The ensuing fury engulfed Grasso in a public and private firestorm that led to his forced
resignation. His successor as interim chair investigated the affair and asked the office of the New
York Attorney General (―AG‖) to pursue formal legal enforcement proceedings. The AG did so,
seeking rescission of the contract on grounds specifically authorized in New York’s nonprofit
corporation law and associated common-law theories related to those statutory grounds. But the
New York Court of Appeals granted Grasso’s motion to dismiss most of the AG’s claims on
jurisdictional grounds.351
The corporate-law statute giving the AG jurisdiction to sue nonprofit corporations
detailed some of the types of claims the AG was authorized to bring.352 Those included the two
being brought—wrongful transfer of corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty. But all
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authorized actions required the AG to prove some element of fault. The court therefore dismissed
all claims the AG brought that did not require such a showing, which included claims for unjust
enrichment based on statutory provisions limiting compensation to reasonable levels and
restitution based on a statutory requirement that a board majority approve executive
compensation.353
Neither the AG nor the courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, ever
considered a more fundamental and simple question: whether the contract was unconscionable.
There is a compelling case that it was. The procedure used to approve the contract was defective.
Taking up action on a material matter not listed on a business meeting agenda is irregular.
Taking final action on a controversial matter at such a meeting when known opponents are
consequently absent is aggressive. Approving this executive’s compensation by less than a
majority board vote violated the New York nonprofit corporation law. The amount—including
the immediate $140 million—was shocking, particularly when it was far from obvious what, if
anything, the NYSE was to get in return. (The transfer was so shocking that it is tempting to
suppose that it even triggered corporate law’s waste doctrine, but that is not a sturdy doctrine to
rely upon.)
Those features of unconscionability manifest the elements of fault that the New York
Court of Appeals said were the only kinds of claims that the New York’s nonprofit-corporation
statute authorized the AG to bring. A claim of contract unconscionability, therefore, would have
had a greater chance of success than those the AG brought and that the court of appeals
dismissed. It seems that the AG did not bring such a claim because that office made the
understandable assumption that the question was entirely one of corporate law—a widespread
assumption that the scope and tenor of the court’s opinion shows the New York Court of Appeals
also shared. Indeed, the New York court’s opinion concentrates entirely on the corporate-law
features of the transaction and litigation, riveting upon the statutory and common-law aspects of
corporate governance—board duties, the business judgment rule, conflicts of interest—without
ever thinking outside that box about the possibility that the case was about the enforceability of a
contract under basic and ancient principles of the common law of contracts.354
3.

Citigroup Inc.

A $68-million severance payment went to CEO Charles Prince of Citigroup Inc. just after
that company self-destructed for its role in the financial catastrophe that began in 2008.355
Shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit in Delaware alleging that the payout was waste.356 The
company’s board moved to dismiss on the ground that the shareholders had failed to make a
demand on the board as the law governing derivative litigation requires.357 The shareholders
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persuaded the court that such a demand would be futile.358 They are therefore in the same place
that the Disney shareholders got to by the middle of their litigation challenging the $140-million
payout to the Disney executive in that case. If this case proceeds under the waste theory, the
shareholders stand an extremely small chance of success on the merits. After all, the company
can point out that it got something in exchange: Prince signed an agreement with non-compete,
non-disparagement, non-solicitation, and release-of-claims provisions.359 If the case made the
claim of contractual unconscionability, the odds of success would improve since those promises
could persuasively be described as trivial formalities. The probability of success would rise more
significantly if the case were heard by a court outside of Delaware.
CONCLUSION
Compensation for corporate executives skyrocketed in the past two decades, with a
particular proliferation of stock-based components. Recent experience challenges many of the
theories supporting the trend, especially the once-heralded notion that they align managerial
incentives with shareholder interests. The new reform agenda prescribes rehabilitation by
redesigning contracts, especially stock-based components, to focus managerial attention on longterm business value rather than short-term price, with suggestions for expanding shareholder
power to increase board accountability.
Yet it remains doubtful whether those steps suffice to restore the erstwhile appeal of
stock-based pay in many cases. Still missing is legal oversight of pay contracts, and there are few
prospects for providing any. Though some see no problem with prevailing conditions while some
opponents might prefer abolishing stock options, this Article offers what amounts to a middle
position: identifying problems and offering a new legal theory of contractual unconscionability
to police obnoxious cases without upsetting legitimate deals.
A fundamental objection to this proposal is how investors may recoil at the prospect of
gadfly fellow shareholders challenging corporate pay contracts. Existing corporate law and
governance controls the gadfly shareholder. Statutes give directors plenary power and
shareholders limited rights. Most decisions are made by directors and officers, not shareholders.
That protects fellow shareholders from each other. Though appealing on a wide range of
subjects, especially routine business transactions and strategy, the system does not work
perfectly for all subjects. The subject of executive compensation illustrates.
There is widespread national debate and valid criticism of executive pay. Although some
believe that the corporate-governance system is self-correcting, supporting evidence is limited,
and most policy levers that have been tried to aid correction have either backfired or seem
unlikely to succeed. Further, the proposed shareholder redress is narrow, faces substantial
hurdles that screen out gadflies, and is subject to judicial supervision that controls gadfly risks.
An additional benefit arises from accepting some cost of risking having gadflies upset the
equilibrium. It is a way to restore a modicum of external pressure on the State of Delaware, the
leading promulgator of corporate law for national use. Historically, Delaware faced such
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pressure from other states when states competed with each other to attract corporate-chartering
business. Many scholars believed that this competition led to optimal law, and though others said
it led to suboptimal law, the practical reality is that the competition has ended, and Delaware
faces no such pressure today.
The federal government still provides some pressure. In the past decade, the two most
propitious times for action occurred in 2002 in the wake of the frauds accompanying the bursting
of the Internet bubble and in 2010 after the financial destruction accompanying the bursting of
the housing bubble. Each episode prompted significant statutory reform: in the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010. Both contained provisions that preempted
traditional state corporation law in a few areas—in 2002, the law targeted boards concerning
accounting-related matters, and in 2010, the law targeted risk-related matters, including
executive compensation.
Though these are nontrivial incursions, they leave Delaware enormous leeway that could
stand an external check from sister states. This Article provides a roadmap for a judicial review
of obnoxious executive-pay packages. In part, it is an invitation to enable Delaware’s sister states
to project incremental pressure on Delaware. That could stimulate a greater appreciation within
Delaware for the effects of its approach to corporate affairs outside the boundaries of the small
state.
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